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REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
FOR YOUTH IN A DIGITAL AGE
Mary Gra w Leary*
The Court must proceed with care when considering the
whole concept of privacy expectations in communications
made on electronic equipment . . . . The judiciary risks error
by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implica-
tions of emerging technology before its role in society has be-
come clear.1
INTRODUCTION
"Technology is changing everything." This often repeated
claim is made in so many contexts that it has become a clich6,
but like many clich6s, it is often true. Perhaps its impact is
greatest with regard to what Brandeis and Warren, in their
seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article, described as the
most fundamental right: the right to be left alone. We see tech-
nology's effect on that "right" in criminal litigation. Here courts
struggle to apply the basic rule that the Fourth Amendment
protects only reasonable expectations of privacy. However, the
electronic erosion of privacy in everyday life cannot help but
impact which expectations of privacy remain reasonable. This
is compounded by the fact that many people in their teens and
twenties arguably approach privacy differently than their older
counterparts, some choosing to expose their thoughts, activi-
ties, and images to the inquisitive eyes of friends, acquain-
tances, and even strangers. Consider: 93% of American homes
* Associate Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. Special thanks to Thomas Clancy, Cliff Fishman, and Anne McKenna for their
insight and comments. Thanks to Julie Kendrick for countless drafts and to Kristen
Kelley for diligent research.
I City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
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have computers and 84% of them have Internet access; 2 66-71%
of youth aged 8-18 own their own cell phones,3 many of which
have Internet access where youth engage in the most popular
Internet activity, interacting with social networking.4 On social
networking sites, 64% of online 12-to-17-year-olds are not only
obtaining content but creating and sharing it in the form of
online journals, blogs, photo and video sharing.5 As such activi-
ties become the norm, query what expectations of privacy re-
main reasonable. This is particularly apparent when one focus-
es on a subset of the population that has grown up in this new
world order: youth.6
2 VICTORIA J. RIDEOUT ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, GENERATION M2:
MEDIA IN THE LIVES OF 8- TO 18-YEAR-OLDS, at 21 (2010); see also SONIA LIVINGSTONE
& MAGDALENA BOBER, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UK CHILDREN Go
ONLINE 8 (2005) (finding that in 2005, 75% of 9- to 19-year-olds access the Internet
from a home computer, game console, or digital television).
3 RIDEOUT ET AL., supra note 2, at 3, 18; AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET &
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, TEENS AND MOBILE PHONES OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS: PEW
INTERNET LOOKS BACK 4 (2009).
RIDEOUT ET AL., supra note 2, at 21; HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM
DICTIONARY 1032-33 (25th ed. 2009) (defining social networking as "a website with a
big database of information about people and their interests" characterized by the
ability to create a personal profile, share photos or blogs, receive messages, limit it to a
circle of friends, or open it to the public).
5 AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, TEENS AND
SOCIAL MEDIA: THE USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA GAINS A GREATER FOOTHOLD IN TEEN LIFE
AS THEY EMBRACE THE CONVERSATIONAL NATURE OF INTERACTIVE ONLINE MEDIA 2, 4,
12 (2007).
6 "Youth" is a general term. Some refer to this subset as, inter alia, "minors,"
"digital natives," or "teens." JOHN PALFREY & URs GASSER, BORN DIGITAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 346 (2008) (defining
digital native as a person born in the digital age (post 1980) who has access to net-
worked technologies, with strong computer skills and knowledge); Sonia Livingstone,
Taking Risky Opportunities in Youthful Content Creation: Teenagers' Use of Social
Networking Sites for Intimacy, Privacy, and Self-Expression, 10 NEW MEDIA & SOC'Y
393 (2008) (teenagers); MIZUKO ITO ET AL., JOHN D. & CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR
FOUNDATION, LIVING AND LEARNING WITH NEW MEDIA: SUMMARY FINDINGS FROM THE
DIGITAL YOUTH PROJECT 4 (2008) (youth). Because technology is so dynamic, trends
among youth are so variable, and scholarship is so diverse in its demographic focus, no
term is sufficient. The author adopts the imperfect terms "youth" or "digital native" to
refer to the generation of technically connected young people who were born into a
digitally connected norm, after the early 1990's when the Internet became a commer-
cially available system used by the general public. See, e.g, Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v.
Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 438 (Md. 2009). However, as discussed infra Part II C, for legal
analysis, the article focuses on a subset of youth-public school students-as they
Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age
In this digital age, individuals and society as a whole
struggle to balance the advantages of digital connectivity
against the reality that this very connectivity inevitably gives
others access, licitly or illicitly, to private information.7 While
risks to privacy are certainly not limited to youth, an argument
can be made that conceptualizations of privacy for those who
have grown up with this technology are unique. One could fur-
ther argue that as a group, youth possibly demonstrate distinct
expectations of privacy when compared with older generations.8
This article concerns the intersection of youth, technology, ex-
pectations of privacy, and the Fourth Amendment. More specif-
ically, the article examines whether this "norm" of increased
information disclosure, which can be characterized as condi-
tioned, combined with decreased privacy rights in certain con-
texts effectively strips or compromises the Fourth Amendment
protections of a class of people-youth.
It may be too early to fully measure technology's effect on
privacy expectations of society as a whole. By focusing on a
subset of society-youth-some of the questions are more ma-
nageably explored. By specifically examining students, and the
reality that youth, as a group, may have a different concept of
privacy online, this article seeks to explore a Fourth Amend-
ment issue never before faced. What is society to do when a
large subset of citizens, as a result of social or technological
present the most pressing legal concerns due to the developed case law decreasing their
privacy rights in a school setting.
7 See generally MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
DIGITAL FOOTPRINTS: ONLINE IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AND SEARCH IN THE AGE OF
TRANSPARENCY 1 (2007); MARY MADDEN & ADAM SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN
LIFE PROJECT, REPUTATION MANAGEMENT AND SOCIAL MEDIA (2010); see also PALFREY
& GASSER, supra note 6, at 23 ("Young people-among many others-are using the
Internet to share more personal information about themselves than ever before.").
8 See, e.g., PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 6, at 7 ("Digital Natives' ideas about
privacy . . . are different from those of their parents and grandparents."); Press Re-
lease, PR Newswire, What is Privacy? Poll Exposes Generational Divide on Expecta-
tions of Privacy, According to Zogby/Cong. Internet Caucus Advisory Comm. Survey
(Jan. 30, 2007), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/what-is-privacy-poll-exposes
-generational-divide-on-expectations-of-privacy-according-to-zogbycongressional-Intern
et-caucus-advisory-committee-survey-54015452.html ("[A] vast chasm exists between
what 18-24 year-olds believe is an invasion of privacy and what other Americans con-
sider to be an intrusion.").
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conditioning and not government action, demonstrates an ar-
guably lesser expectation of privacy? Part I of this article ex-
amines data regarding digital natives and their interaction
with current technologies. Part II reviews current law regard-
ing expectations of privacy in general, under the Katz test,9
and more specifically, for public school students, under New
Jersey v. T.L. O.1o and Safford Unified School District v. Red-
ding." The article further reviews what guidance the Court has
offered in situations where the familiar two-pronged Katz test
is not useful. Part III reviews possible solutions to this prob-
lem, calling into question the utility of the Katz test. The ar-
ticle explores whether a more value-laden approach outlined by
Justice Harlan in his dissent in United States v. White may
offer a more promising solution than the traditional Katz anal-
ysis. Because the jurisprudence addressing searches of public
school students in a school setting is developing, Part IV ap-
plies the different approaches offered by the Court to a hypo-
thetical modification of the facts in Redding. In Redding, the
Supreme Court held that when school officials conducted a vir-
tual strip search of a teenage girl to investigate allegations that
she possessed ibuprofen, they violated the girl's Fourth
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches. 12 Sup-
pose instead of the virtual strip search, school officials had
seized her cell phone and examined its digital contents. This
article explores that scenario and concludes that, for several
reasons, the Supreme Court's current approach to applying the
Fourth Amendment (often referred to as the "reasonable expec-
tation of privacy" approach) is inadequate to sufficiently ad-
dress the issues presented in this all-too-common scenario. It
further argues that the proposal of Justice Harlan in White
may be the pathway out of the problem.
9 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The
"Katz test" refers to the two-pronged test proposed in Justice Harlan's Katz concur-
rence and later adopted in full by the Court.
10 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
" Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
12 See inrda, note 134.
1038 [VOL. 80: 3
2011] Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age 1039
I. YOUTH, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE INTERNET
A. Youth and Technology
Much discussion is occurring regarding online activity's
ability to compromise the user's privacy, regardless of his or
her age. Indiscriminate sharing of information or ignorance of
vulnerabilities are not activities limited to youth.' However,
significant discussion is also taking place about the digital di-
vide between older and younger generations. 14 It has been sug-
gested that many people can roughly be categorized into two
groups: "digital natives," i.e., those who were born and grew up
in a post-commercialization of the World Wide Web, and "digi-
tal immigrants," i.e., those who have had to assimilate to a
post-World Wide Web universe.15 This divide manifests itself in
13 MADDEN ET AL., supra note 7, at ii (Forty-three percent of online adults "neither
worry about their personal information nor take steps to limit the amount of informa-
tion that can be found out about them online."). MADDEN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 2
(noting that some Internet users are careful in how they project themselves online.
Others "embrace an open approach" and "do not restrict what they share.").
14 See, e.g., SYDNEY JONES & SUSANNAH Fox, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE
PROJECT, PEW INTERNET PROJECT DATA MEMO: GENERATIONS ONLINE IN 2009, at 1-2, 5
(2009); see also MADDEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 20; PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 6,
at 109, 125, 131 (discussing the technology gap between young people and many of
their parents).
Digital media and online communication have become pervasive in the lives
of youth in the United States. Social network sites, online games, video-
sharing sites, and gadgets such as iPods and mobile phones are now fixtures
of youth culture. . . . [Liess than a decade ago these technologies had barely
registered in the lives of U.S. children and teens.
ITO ET AL., supra note 6, at 4; see also id. at 36. However, scholars caution against an
assumption that youth are unconcerned with privacy. See generally Susan C. Herring,
Questioning the Generational Divide: Technological Exoticism and Adult Constructions
of Online Youth Identity, in YOUTH, IDENTITY & DIGITAL MEDIA 71, 86 (David Buck-
ingham ed., 2008); see also Protecting Youths in an Online World: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, and Ins. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., 111th Cong. 2-5 (2010) (prepared statement of the Federal Trade Comm'n);
danah boyd & Eszter Hargittai, Facebook Privacy Settings: Who Cares. FIRST
MONDAY, Aug. 2, 2010, at 2.
15 E.g., NEWTON, supra note 4, at 369 (referencing a 2005 Rupert Murdoch speech
describing one who came to the Internet later in life as a "digital immigrant"); Herring,
supra note 14, at 71 ("Children born in the mid- to late-1980s and the 1990s have been
labeled the 'Internet Generation': the first generation to grow up in a world where the
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a number of ways. This article will focus on one of those data
points: youth and their expectation of privacy regarding media
use. By "media use" this article speaks generally about the in-
terconnectivity of the technological devices that allow for the
consumption and creation of Internet content. 16 Technology is
arguably reshaping social norms for young people, who are
more likely than older citizens to read blogs, write their own
blogs," use social networking sites,18 create personal profiles
on those sites, update friends about their lives, or keep track of
and communicate with friends on the Internet. 19 Prior to dis-
cussing the ramifications of this on privacy expectations, this
article will review what is known about youth and their con-
sumption and creation of content through media. 20
Internet was always present." This generation is also called the "Net Generation," the
"Net-Gen," "Generation i," the "Digital Generation," or the "Millenials.").
16 See RIDEOUT ET AL., supra note 2, at 2, 10 (tracking media use such as the
watching of television programming on a variety of platforms, listening to music, using
computers, playing video games, reading print, or watching movies).
17 "The word blog, used as a noun, is a contraction of the words Web and Log and
generally describes a site that 'contains dated text entries in reverse chronological
order (most recent first) about a particular topic.' (citation omitted). A blog can serve as
an online newsletter or as a personal journal-where an individual can post concerns,
ideas, opinions, etc.-and it can contain links to web sites or can use images or video."
Indep. Newspapers v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 437 (Md. 2009); see also NEWTON, supra
note 4, at 197.
1s Social Networking sites are defined as "web-based services that allow individu-
als to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articu-
late a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse
their list of connections and those made by others within the system." danah m. boyd &
Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 2 (2007). boyd prefers the term "social network sites"
because participants do not network as much as communicate with people already part
of their network. Id.; see also PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 6, at 350 (defining "social
networking sites" as "a site . . . that connects . . . people in order to enable the flow of
information among users"). Scholarship utilizes both terms as will this article. The
MacArthur Foundation Report uses the term "networked publics" to "describe partici-
pation in public culture that is supported by online networks." ITO ET AL., supra note 6,
at 10.
19 JONES & Fox, supra note 14, at 3.
20 Of course, one should be cautious about over-generalization. No subset of society
can be indiscriminately grouped under one label as acting uniformly. What follows is a
collection of general trends. Certainly within the imperfect label "youth," see supra
note 6, there are individual behaviors outside of these trends and many factors (access
to technology, chief among them) contribute to practices. See Alice Marwick, Diego
Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age
Two aspects of youth participation with the Internet are
relevant to the privacy discussion. These include first, the
number of different platforms through which youth are access-
ing the Internet, and second, their online activities that include
both media consumption and content creation.
Media use is no longer limited to any one platform, such as
the television or the computer. The explosion of mobile media
and its access to the Internet has fueled an increase in both
media consumption and content creation. 21 The Kaiser Founda-
tion found that young people spend an average of 7:38 hours a
day "using media," excluding computer use for schoolwork. 2 2
"Media use" encompasses television content, music, video
games, print, movies, and the Internet.23 This amount of time
represents a significant increase, in the past five years, of all
forms of media use with the exception of reading.2 4 The in-
crease of the availability and use of mobile and online media
has fueled this growth with "[t]he vast majority of young people
now carry[ing] devices on which they listen to music and in
many cases connect to the Internet and watch videos." 25 This
transformation of the cell phone from a telephone into a media
content delivery platform facilitated the "explosion in media
consumption among America's youth."26
Murgia Diaz, & John Palfrey, Youth, Privacy and Reputation 12-21 (Berkman Ctr.
Research, Publ'n No. 2010-5 & Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 10-29, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1588163; cf. MADDEN & SMITH, supra note 7.
21 RIDEOUT ET AL., supra note 2, at 2-3. Cell phone ownership grew among teens
from 39% to 66% in just five years. Id. at 3, 10, 18. The Pew Center reports that 71% of
teens own cell phones, with 84% of 17-year-olds doing so. LENHART, supra note 3, at 7-
8.
22 RIDEOUT ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. If one were to include multi-tasking among
different forms of media separately, then the total time would rise to 10:45. Id. at 4.
23 Id. at 2, 6-7, 10. In another study, students in seventh, eighth and ninth grades
reported spending an average of 21 hours per week engaged in "various online activi-
ties." SAMUEL C. MCQUADE, III & NEEL SAMPAT, ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, SURVEY OF INTERNET AND AT-RISK BEHAVIORS 29, 31 (2008).
24 RIDEOUT ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.
25 Id. at 3.
26 Id. at 3, 18; LENHART, supra note 3, at 8 (cell phone is the dominant form of
communication for teens); MCQUADE & SAMPAT, supra note 23, at 28 (as students get
older, devices are increasingly used for interactive communication). Cell phones are no
longer simply devices with which to speak to others, but "have morphed from a way to
hold a conversation with someone to a way to consume more media." RIDEOUT ET AL.,
2011] 1041
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This increase in platforms provides youth with more va-
ried ways not only to consume, but to create content and share
information. This reality directly affects what young people
perceive as private. For example, computers used to be neces-
sary in order to engage in the most popular computer activity-
interacting within social networking sites.27 Now, with most
cell phones having Internet connectivity, this activity can be
done from multiple platforms and locations. One can take a
picture or video, update his or her location, notify contacts,
a.k.a. "Friends," "fans," or contacts,28 and post the picture or
video on the Web without ever sitting down at a computer. 29
An important aspect of media use is content creation. It is
here, at the social networking site, as well as other fora, in
which content creation occurs and has the potential to signifi-
supra note 2, at 3; see also AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
MOBILE ACCESS 2010, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media
//Files/Reports/2010/PIPMobileAccess_2010.pdf (noting the growth of the use of non-
voice data applications on cell phones). For example, one study reports seventh to
twelfth graders spend an average of 90 minutes per day sending an average of 118 text
messages. RIDEOUT ET AL., supra note 2, at 18.
27 RIDEOUT ET AL., supra note 2, at 21 (noting that 25% of seventh to twelfth grad-
ers' recreational time is spent on social networking sites, and 15% watching videos on
YouTube-type web sites).
28 Following the lead of Professor Grimmelmann, this article will use the term
'contact' to describe a user with whom one has an explicit link on a social network
site." James Grimmelmann, Sa ving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1143 (2009). The
label given to one's network of contacts will be used generally, or with respect to Face-
book "Friends" as distinct from the colloquial "friends." "Friends" are people within a
social networking site who enjoy privileges such as being able to view one's profile or
other information. PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 6, at 347.
29 See ITO ET AL., supra note 6, at 26 ("[Plersonal photos . . . are readily available in
social contexts mean[ing] that visual media become more deeply embedded in the eve-
ryday communication of young people."). Much social networking time is spent both
creating content and exploring that of others. The numbers participating in this are
staggering, with Facebook claiming to have more than 500 million active users who
produce 60 million status updates per day, upload 3 billion photos each month, and
share 530 billion pieces of content each week. Press Room: Statistics, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). Addi-
tionally, MySpace claims to have more than 100 million active users. Gregory Spizer,
Understanding of Social Media Intrinsic to Modern League Practice, 241 LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER 5 (2010). Teens joined MySpace en masse in 2004, and most teens with
profiles have them on MySpace. boyd & Ellison, supra note 18, at 7; AMANDA LENHART
& MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, PEW INTERNET PROJECT
DATA MEMO: SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES AND TEENS: AN OVERVIEW 1-2 (2007).
Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age
cantly implicate privacy. Sixty-four percent of youth online be-
tween the ages of 12 and 17 have participated in creating con-
tent by sharing photographs, stories, video, and art; creating or
working on web pages or blogs for themselves or for others; and
creating an online journal or maintaining their own web page.30
This may initially appear merely as a new way for youth to
communicate and, therefore, raises no more privacy implica-
tions than the adoption of the telephone. However, youth's
sense of the private nature of this material is remarkable and
has created some concern. Social network sites require the
member to post a profile replete with personal information. For
example, "[a] fully filled-out Facebook profile contains about
forty [data points of] personal information, including . . . reli-
gious views[,] . .. contact information[,] .. . [and] sexual prefe-
rence," all information previously considered by the law as per-
sonal.31 Their social networking pages can contain personal
information about their location, plans, associates, much like a
personal diary and address book, simply all online. Blog crea-
tion or commentary doubled between 2004 and 2006.32 Forty-
seven percent of online teens have uploaded pictures where
others can see them, and 14-25% have posted videos. 33 While a
minority of teens (21%) consistently shares photos without re-
3o Thirty-nine percent share photos, stories, and art; 33% create work on blogs and
web pages for others; 28% create their own journal; 27% maintain their own web page,
and 26% remix content to create their own. LENHART ET AL., supra note 5, at i, 34; see
also Livingstone, supra note 6, at 4 ("M]ore than ever before using media means creat-
ing as well as receiving."). Girls are more active in content creation, with 55% of such
creators being girls. LENHART ET AL., supra note 5, at 4; see also MADDEN ET AL., supra
note 7, at 19 (reporting in 2007 that 33% of adult Internet users post creative content
online and 36% upload photos, while 47% of teens do so).
s1 Grimmelmann, supra note 28, at 1149-51 (listing all information available on a
Facebook profile and how it is used); see also DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK
EFFECT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPANY THAT IS CONNECTING THE WORLD 201
(2010) ("Many users willingly fill out extensive details about their career, relationships,
interests, and personal 'history.").
32 LENHART ET AL., supra note 5, at ii, 8. Additionally, four out of five social net-
working users posted messages on a wall (89% of girls and 79% of boys). LENHART &
MADDEN, supra note 29, at 6.
33 LENHART ET AL., supra note 5, at i, ii, 14 (14%), 13 (47%); RIDEOUT ET AL., supra
note 2, at 22 (25%). This is in contrast to 8% of adult Internet users. MADDEN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 19.
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strictions, only 38% restrict access "most of the time."34 Howev-
er, "for the most part, teens who post video files want them to
be seen," with 46% of video posters reporting they never re-
strict access to videos. 35
The vast array of data points that make up "personal infor-
mation" in the age of online media are nearly impossible to
quantify or neatly define. Name, address, and phone number
are just the basics in a world where voluntarily posting self-
authored content such as text, photos, and video has become a
cornerstone of engagement in the era of the participatory
Web. The more content we contribute voluntarily to the public
or semi-public corners of the Web, the more we are not only
findable, but also knowable. 36
Additionally, social networking sites offer various avenues
to communicate, such as private messages, messages posted on
friends' web pages, or comments on others' blogs to name a
few. 37
B. Online Youth and Privacy
Recent scholarship stresses that while digital natives may
conceptualize privacy differently, that does not translate into
devaluing privacy. 38 Despite a media panic, much research in-
dicates youth use this new media more to reach out to friends
with whom they usually socialize than to be in contact with
adult strangers. 39 When asked about their attitudes toward
34 LENHART ET AL., supra note 5, at iii, 14.
3s Id.
36 MADDEN ET AL., supra note 7, at i.
3 LENHART & MADDEN, supra note 29, at 6. Ninety-one percent of youth who use
social networking use it to stay in touch with friends they see frequently and 72% do so
to schedule or coordinate with friends. Id. at 2, 6. Twenty-six percent of youth send
messages (email or Instant Messages ("IM")) through social networks. Also, of all of the
youth who use social networks, 54% send IM or texts through such sites. LENHART ET
AL., supra note 5, at 8, 12.
- See, e.g., Marwick et al., supra note 20, at 60; ITO ET AL., supra note 6; MADDEN
& SMITH, supra note 7; boyd & Hargittai, supra note 14.
3 ITO ET AL., supra note 6, at 26; Livingstone, supra note 6, at 4-5 (referring to a
"media panic" that "amplif[ies] public anxieties" associated with social networking and
that teenagers have "no sense of privacy or shame").
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privacy, youth express a concern about both corporate access
and social access to personal information.40 Indeed, Livingstone
suggests that the distinction between youth and older citizens
is not a lack of concern about privacy but a different definition
of privacy in which young people define it without regard to the
types of information revealed, but rather, regarding control
over who learns the information. 4 1
While research does support a notion that youth and
young adults care about privacy, and are at times more active
in managing their online reputation than older users, it also
supports that such attitudes do not always translate into prac-
tices that protect privacy. 42 For example, a study comparing
young adults' privacy attitudes and actions within social net-
works found a "dichotomy between [Facebook] members' stated
privacy concerns (high) and actual information hiding strate-
gies" due to peer pressure, unawareness, and a level of trust
toward Facebook. 43 While youth appear to recognize the vulne-
rability of private information disclosed to peers who might
forward that information to others, some scholarship suggests
40 Chris Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults From Older Adults
When It Comes To Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies, SSRN Research Paper
3, 12 (Apr. 14, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864 (finding that when
young adults were asked about attitudes regarding collection and use of personal in-
formation, their response did not differ greatly from adults); Allessandro Acquisti &
Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness, Information Sharing, and Privacy on
the Facebook (PET 2006) (similar study of university community members found atti-
tudinal concern).
41 Livingstone, supra note 6, at 10; MADDEN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 5-6 (noting
the debate among scholars and the argument that Internet users sensitivity to privacy
concerns are "highly dependent on context" and often "oversimplified."). Marwick et al.,
supra note 20, at 60-61. Defining and conceptualizing privacy is a herculean task. For a
thoughtful discussion of various conceptualizations of privacy, and their critiques, see
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 14-38 (2008).
42 boyd & Hargittai, supra note 14, at 2 (noting that research suggests that young
adults (18- to 29-year-olds) are conscious of privacy issues and more actively manage
the access to profiles; but acknowledging a lack of information regarding the extent to
which these changes meet their privacy preferences). Hoofnagle et al., supra note 40, at
17-18 (finding differences between attitudes regarding collection of personal data and
the practices of protecting such personal data); Acquisti & Gross, supra note 40.
43 Acquisti & Gross, supra note 40, at 13, 17; see also Livingstone, supra note 6, at
10-11 (teenagers' primary goal is not to hide information from strangers, but to share
private experiences with friends).
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they are arguably (or seem to be) less aware of the fact that
their online activities expose private information to the world
at large. 44 The picture is not clear, however. Research among
young adults suggests an emerging landscape in which those
18-29 year olds who are more skilled and engaged on social
networking sites are more likely to modify their profile and
manage their reputation. 45
"The divergence in privacy norms between heavily wired
teens and their parents (to say nothing of their grandparents)
is striking; the personal information already online would suf-
fice to ruin the political careers of millions of young people if
they were judged by the standards we apply to adult politi-
cians."4 6 One-third of online teens display personal information
with no limitations at all.4 7 Moreover, the remaining two-thirds
only limit it "in some way."48 This may reflect in some cases
actual and effective limits, but in other cases, minimal limits
such as only allowing "only contacts" to view their information,
44 On the one hand, the Pew Center reports "fewer communications are private
anymore. . . [and] the most commonly experienced bullying is having someone take a
private email, IM, or text message, and forward it to someone else or post it publicly."
AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, CYBERBULLYING AND
ONLINE TEENS 2-3 (2007); see also MCQUADE & SAMPAT, supra note 23, at 13, 16, 27
(noting that students are more likely to be victimized, including hacking and bullying,
by other students whom they know); boyd & Hargittai, supra note 14 (calling for more
research on the alignment and between preferences and practices). Notwithstanding
this, scholars observe that the "backbone" of social networking sites remains the "visi-
ble profiles that display an articulated list of Friends who are also users of the system."
boyd & Ellison, supra note 18, at 2; see also MADDEN & SMITH, supra note 7, at 6 (dis-
cussing how young adults online are more active online managers of reputation, but
many adults take the "path of least resistance" in managing their reputation online).
45 boyd & Hargittai, supra note 14, at 18, 20, 25; MADDEN & SMITH, supra note 7.
46 Emily Nussbaum, Say Everything, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 12, 2007, at 24 ("More young
people are putting more personal information out in public than any older person ever
would-and yet they seem mysteriously healthy and normal, save for an entirely dif-
ferent definition of privacy.").
7 In fact, 77% of teens who create a profile say it is visible online. LENHART &
MADDEN, supra note 29, at 5. Although a comparable percentage of adults (82%) report
the same, a much larger percentage of youth (55% and 20% of adults) have profiles.
MADDEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 20.
48 LENHART & MADDEN, supra note 29, at 5; LENHART ET AL., supra note 5, at 13;
MADDEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 20.
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but then accepting any request to be a contact, thus exposing
their private information to large numbers of people.49
One may wonder why people, particularly young people,
compromise their privacy so extensively through social net-
working sites. Some scholars believe that users need to perce-
ive a benefit in exchange for privacy disclosure risks. Grim-
melmann argues that social networking sites offer three impor-
tant motivators: identity, relationship, and community.50 The
Internet allows one to create an identity, to advertise it to de-
velop relationships (some fleeting), and to establish oneself as a
leader in a given community. Disclosure of information, for ex-
ample, compiling a large number of contacts to establish one-
self as popular, appears inversely related to privacy risks. 51
Livingstone argues that teenagers are attracted to online inte-
raction because it is a space to experience adolescence (for
some, to construct personalities, for others, to take risks) with-
out observation. 52 "The complex relationship between opportu-
nity and risk is not distinct to the Internet but is, rather, a fea-
ture of adolescence."5 3
49 In Study, Facebook Users Share with Stranger, WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 2007, at B3
(discussing research from Sophos Security firm claiming 41% of Facebook users were
willing to share personal information with a stranger); Facebook: The Privacy Chal-
lenge, SOPHOS.COM, http://www.sophos.com/security/topic/facebook.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 2010) (Forty-six percent of Facebook users accepted Friend requests from fic-
tional stranger, 89% of users in their 20s divulged birth dates, and 30-40% of users
disclosed data about friends and family); David Ramsay, Marshwood Middle School
Parents Told 58 out of 60 Kids Accepted Unknown Facebook Friend, SEACOAST ONLINE
(Nov. 21, 2009, 2:00 AM), http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/200 9 11 21-NEWS-
911210335 (reporting that Internet safety expert connected with 60 honors students
and 58 of them allowed her to "Friend" them without knowing who she was).
50 Grimmelmann, supra note 28, at 1151-56; see also PALFREY & GASSER, supra
note 6, at 25 (discussing the importance of identity to the digital native and the reasons
why they share information, including to build trust with others); boyd & Ellison, su-
pra note 18, at 7; Livingstone, supra note 6, at 10 ("[Tjeenagers must and do disclose
personal information in order to sustain intimacy .... ); see also id. at 5.
51 Contacts or "Friends" may be added by friends or strangers. Grimmelmann,
supra note 28, at 1175. The visibility of said profiles and list of contacts is crucial and
varies among social networking sites, many of which are by default available to the
public or others, whose visibility the user limits to a circle of contacts. boyd & Ellison,
supra note 18, at 3. While "Friends" require confirmation from both parties, some oth-
ers do not. Id.
52 Livingstone, supra note 6, at 5.
5 3 Id.
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While the idea of youth creating and experimenting with
different social identities is not new, a significant difference is
that youth are doing so in digital formats that can be easily
accessed by anyone and difficult to manage. 54
1. Commercial Interest in Obtaining Personal Information and
Risk-Taking Youth
Notwithstanding a perception of privacy, research indi-
cates that youth often use the Internet to publicly share a va-
riety of sensitive information.55 While youth may characterize
some of this material as limited in access, the accuracy of this
perception is likely to continuously falter, particularly as the
companies that facilitate social networking make more and
more of their information searchable, and repeatedly change
their privacy policies.56
54 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 6, at 30, 44. While 55% of online teens create
profiles, only 20% of adults did so in 2006. MADDEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 1. While
Madden reports that young adults (18-29) most actively manage their privacy settings,
they also "are by far the most likely to say that they have posted content to social net-
working sites that they later regret sharing." MADDEN AND SMITH, supra note 7, at 30.
55 MCQUADE & SAMPAT, supra note 23, at 9, 15, 29. Acquisti and Gross note that
the combination of weak security controls by design combined with decreasing costs for
data mining mean "ostensibly private social network" data is public. Acquisti & Gross,
supra note 40, at 2 ("unprecedented phenomena of information revelation"). For exam-
ple, children as young as the fourth through sixth grades "frequently" engage in social
networking activities involving posting "personal, potentially exploitable, information
about themselves online." MCQUADE & SAMPAT, supra note 23, at 9; see also id. at 15
(Twenty-two percent of tenth through twelfth graders provide personal information
online); id. at 29 ("[P]robably due to the increased popularity of social networking sites
many students [in grades seven through nine] are using the Internet to publicly post a
variety of sensitive information.").
56 While youth may feel that they are the customers of the social networking site,
this is indeed a misperception. A customer is an entity who pays the social networking
sites for the service. Profits for most social networking sites do not come from members,
but the advertisers who seek the personal information available on social networking
sites for targeted marketing. See Is Social Network Advertising Ready for Prime
Time, EMARKETER.COM, http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?R=1007165 (last
visited Nov. 8, 2010) (projecting that "US marketers will increase social network ad
spending 13.2% in 2010, [up] to $1.3 billion"). "Facebook makes personal data provided
by users available to advertisers, in aggregated form, for its own commercial gain."
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 31, at 202. Indeed, one of Facebook's co-founders stated as
much when he said Facebook "can provide really good, relevant advertising to people
because they tell us exactly what they are interested in, and who they know, and those
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Facebook itself is an excellent example of the changing
tides of a social networking site. It originated as a closed net-
work for Harvard University, grew rapidly to several hundred
universities, eventually expanded to high school students, and
ultimately opened unlimited access to anyone claiming to be
over 13 years old.57 While it originally kept profiles internal,
currently "limited profiles" are searchable on the Internet with
any search engine.5 8 Although the changes admittedly did not
occur without notice to members, more specific changes in pri-
vacy, which always move in the direction of decreasing privacy,
take place. This is consistent with the Facebook Terms of Use,
people tell us what they're interested in." Alexei Oreskovic, Revenue Tops $800 Million
for Facebook, TORONTO STAR, June 19, 2010, at B4. EMarketer reports that "social
network users create a gigantic amount of data about themselves-their friend net-
works, likes and dislikes, content-sharing activities and more." Is Social Network Ad-
vertising Ready for Prime Time?, supra. This prompted an analyst to describe social
networking sites' advertising as "a marketer's dream come true." Id. Such sites' cus-
tomers, (i.e., profit sources) are online advertisers. The product they sell these adver-
tisers is the users' information. So, far from being the customer, youth and all users of
social networking sites are, in fact, the product sold. Acquisti argues that social net-
working sites are imagined communities because security-access controls are weak by
design to make it easier for people to join and contact others through sharing of per-
sonal information, hence, its commercial value. Acquisti & Gross, supra note 40, at 3
(discussing financial profits such sites have made from marketers, among other
things). Livingstone expounded on this concern by noting that privacy settings are
inadequate in affording teenagers the level of intimacy they want. Livingstone, supra
note 6, at 11 (noting the "(mis)match between technological affordances and teenagers'
conceptions of friendship"); see also boyd & Hargittai, supra note 14, at 25 (noting the
vulnerability of the population of least skilled Internet users is magnified by how com-
panies set up or modify default privacy settings); PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 6, at
56 (documenting the evolution of default privacy settings on Facebook and MySpace to
allow increased search ability). Similarly, big businesses search the web for informa-
tion on individuals to obtain and store what they value. Id. at 45, 56-58, 65 (document-
ing the lack of awareness among young people to protect privacy and the challenge of
staying current with privacy policies).
5- FACEBOOK, Privacy Policy, http://www.Facebook.com/policy.php (last visited
Aug. 25, 2010). Kirkpatrick argues, however, that its membership is "common among
younger and younger children-it is now commonly used by many eleven-year-olds and
those even younger, despite Facebook rules that users must be thirteen." KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 31, at 205.
58Grimmelmann, supra note 28, at 1169.
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which allow Facebook to change its privacy policies unilateral-
ly.59
For example, in 2006, Facebook attempted to implement a
new feature entitled "Newsfeeds," which displayed a list of a
member's every action to all one's "Friends." This resulted in
the broadcasting of every change in status, addition, or deletion
of a Friend, comment made, or group joined to all of the mem-
ber's Friends.60 This outraged members, the largest group be-
ing Students Against Facebook Newsfeeds, which grew to boast
several hundred thousand members.61 Facebook partially re-
treated from its original plan and allowed users more control
and also the ability to exclude certain items from appearing on
other Friends' Newsfeeds. 62
Similarly, in April of 2010, Facebook unilaterally moved to
expand Facebook functions across the Web. 63 The new policy
"required users to opt out if they wished to keep information
private, making most of the information pubic by default."64
The "opt out" provision required a member to sift through ap-
proximately 150 options and determine to whom the informa-
tion would be made available, making what privacy controls
5 See, e.g., Caroline McCarthy, Do Facebook's New Privacy Settings Let It Off the
Hook?, CNET NEwS, (May 26, 2010, 12:07 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_3-
20006054-36.html (noting that concern about "how easily and willfully [Facebook]
could make a major turnaround in user experience" with its privacy changes); Grim-
melmann, supra note 28, at 1183. Facebook also warns users that it may retain data on
them even after they delete their accounts, that it may surveil them even when they're
not using Facebook, that it uses their information for marketing purposes (including
targeted ads), that it retains discretion over whether and when to share their informa-
tion with their parties, and that sometimes Facebook even deliberately gives out ac-
counts to let outsiders see what's going on inside. FACEBOOK, supra note 57, para. 9
"Other Terms"; see also KIRKPATRICK, supra note 31, at 204. Indeed, when some ques-
tioned the privacy implications of Twitter archiving all messages with the Library of
Congress, a Library representative cited to the user's agreement to the terms of ser-
vice. Steve Lohr, It's History, So Be Careful Using Twitter, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010,
at B2.
60 Grimmelmann, supra note 28, at 1146.
61 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 169 (2007).
62 Grimmelmann, supra note 28, at 1146; boyd & Hargittai, supra note 14, at 4.
63 Miguel Helft & Jenna Wortham, Facebook Bows to Pressure Over Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2010, at Bi.
6 Nick Bilton, Price of Facebook Privacy? Start Clicking, N.Y. TIMES, May 13,
2010, at B8.
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were available "effectively unusable for many people."65 Addi-
tionally, the site planned an "instant personalization" feature
that allowed outside partner sites (such as Pandora.com and
yelp.com) to gain access to personal data of members.66
After weeks of pressure from outraged users, privacy ad-
vocates, and government officials, Facebook announced a
change to this policy. 67 Not retracting completely, the default
remained that the information was publicly available. Howev-
er, it did create a much simpler method of adjusting who could
view one's information, creating simpler controls for the user
who could now limit about fifteen categories of information to
be visible to Friends, Friends of Friends, or everyone on the
Internet.68 The publicly available information in its directory of
users was also limited to less information than it previously
required of members.69 These potentially privacy compromising
actions by Facebook continue in 2011.70
65 Helft & Wortham, supra note 63; Bilton, supra note 64 (asserting that the opt-
out provision required users to click through more than 50 privacy buttons, choosing
among more than 170 options); Mark Zuckerberg, From Facebook, Answering Privacy
Concerns With New Settings, WASH. POST, May 24, 2010, at A19 (CEO of Facebook
acknowledging that members felt privacy controls were too complex).
66 Helft & Wortham, supra note 63; Chloe Albanesius, Facebook Updates Privacy
Policy, Promises Simpler Process, PCMAG.COM., (May 26, 2010), http://www.pcmag.
com/article2/0,2817,2364199,00.asp. Under "instant personalization," when a Facebook
user visits a site, the site can use the user's public Facebook information, including the
name, profile picture, and Friends' information to "personalize the experience." Clint
Boulton, Facebook Instant Personalization Protested by EFF MoveOn.org,
EWEEK.COM, (May 2, 2010), http://eweek.com/c/a/Web-Services-Web-20-and-SOA (fol-
low "3" hyperlink to the third page of articles; then click "Facebook Instant Personali-
zation" hyperlink).
67 Helft & Wortham, supra note 63.
68 Id.; Albanesius, supra note 66; McCarthy, supra note 59 (describing the new
privacy settings).
69 Helft & Wortham, supra note 63. For a discussion of Facebook privacy related
controversies and its relation to the corporate view of transparency, see KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 31, at 199-214. Facebook is not alone. Google, in an attempt to create a
social networking service, Google Buzz, initially automatically enrolled all Gmail users
in this network and unilaterally connected people, thus sharing user's information with
the public and making some posts public without Gmail users' knowledge. Miguel
Helft, Critics Say Google Invades Privacy with New Service, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2010,
at BI; see, e.g., Mukul Kumar, Making Content Social, FIN. EXPRESS, Feb. 25, 2010.
While Google eventually made some changes in the program, it prompted some to won-
der if automatically changing Gmail accounts to Google Buzz accounts and then pro-
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2. Official Interest in Personal Information and Risk-Taking
Youth
While such commercial activity combined with youth risk-
taking demonstrates the immediate risks to privacy, Palfrey
and Gasser persuasively note that the long-term impact for
youth has yet to be determined:
The problem of privacy is exacerbated for young people by the
fact that we are just at the beginning of the digital age. . . .
Digital Natives will be the first to experience the compound-
ing effects of the creation of identities and digital dossiers
over a long period of time. . . . The extent of the damage
caused by harmful information-in terms of who can access it,
when, how, and over what period of time-continues to in-
crease as the use of technology increases. 71
This all may seem simply a social problem. However, this view
of privacy has implications for the Fourth Amendment when
government and school officials utilize such information.
Law enforcement has long used social media in investiga-
tions, engaging in activity that could be considered government
ceeding to upload such personal information of some customers who are minors vi-
olated the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act. Danielle Citron, Boyden on Google
Buzz and COPPA, CONCURRING OPINIONS, Feb. 17, 2010. An additional example of
privacy sharing includes the increasing popularity of "location sharing apps" used on
cellular phones, which allow people to "broadcast their whereabouts through check-ins
on their mobile devices and connect with others nearby." NPR Marketplace Morning
Report: Facebook Privacy (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 18, 2010).
70 See, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, Facebook Address-Sharing Retreat Provides Further
Proof of Law of Unintended Consequences, WASH. POST. (Jan. 18, 2011, 2:11 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/2011/01/facebook-address-sharing bac
kt.html.
71 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 6, at 63-64. Moreover, the Pew Internet & Amer-
ican Life Project reports that concern should extend beyond public digital footprints
because corporate databases routinely archive such information. MADDEN ET AL., supra
note 7, at 2-3 (five most popular search engines routinely archive users search terms,
computer's address and unique identifier for their web browser for 13-18 months).
Others note that "[t]he networked and public nature of these practices makes the 'les-
sons' about social life . . . more consequential and persistent." ITO ET AL., supra note 6,
at 14. Indeed, Twitter is donating its archive of all public "tweets" as well as providing
regular updates to the Library of Congress. Randall Stross, When History Is Compiled
140 Characters At A Time, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at B5.
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monitoring.72 A released Department of Justice document iden-
tifies the utility of social networking sites to "reveal personal
communications[;] establish motives and personal relation-
ships[;] provide information[;] prove and disprove alibis[;] and
establish crime or criminal enterprise."73 It further discusses
the reasons to "go undercover" on such sites to include "com-
municate with suspects/targets [;] gain access to non-public in-
fo[;] [and] map social relationships and networks."74 Further-
more, when a suspect is arrested carrying a cell phone, police
72 Griffin v. State, 995 A.2d 791 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (police using MySpace
posting as evidence of intimidation); Richard Lardner, Break the Law and Your New
"Friend"May Be the FB.I, AP DATASTREAM, Mar. 16, 2010 (describing federal agents
logging on surreptitiously to exchange messages with suspects, identify target's
friends or relatives and browse private information such as postings, personal photo-
graphs and video clips"); Ted Strong, Nelson County Deputies Take Laptops for a Spin,
CHARLOTTESVILLE DAILY PROGRESS, July 4, 2010 (discussing use of social networking
information as an investigative tool to track down information on suspects, locate evi-
dence of a crime, and other activity); Tracy Gordon Fox, Extra Eyes Watch Online,
Police Look Over Kids' Shoulders, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 29, 2006, at Al (police
arresting a high school sophomore after posting threatening messages on his MySpace
account apparently aimed at "student body").
n Letter from Rena Y. Kim, Chief of Freedom of Info./Privacy Act Unit, Office of
Enforcement Operation, to James Tucker, Elec. Frontier Found., Obtaining and Using
Evidence from Social Networking Sites, available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/
social network/20100303_crim socialnetworking.pdf. This document was released to
the Electronic Frontier Foundation through a FOIA request and appears to be related
to Federal Agent Training. Lardner, supra note 72 (locating a suspect through a
Friend's profile). Campus and local police have used social media to identify and arrest
criminals. Lindsey Reiser, To Catch a Thief on Facebook - Campus Police Use Pace-
book to Identify Suspects, ABC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=
9933416 (documenting campus and local police identifying and arresting suspects
through reviewing social media). A recent state level training course entitled "Success-
ful Use of Online Social Networking for Criminal Investigations and Intelligence" notes
that
[o]n-line social networking sites such as MySpace, Facebook are an untapped
resource for many investigators. Gangs and other criminals use the Internet,
particularly MySpace, Facebook and other social networking sites, to recruit
new gang members, plan crimes, brag about their crimes, post pictures of
themselves with their associates, steal identifying information from others
and engage in other various types of illegal activity.
Successful Use of Online Social Networking for Criminal Investigations and Intelli-
gence, PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS (June 17, 2010), available at http://www.in.gov/
ipac/June%2017%200nline%20social%20networking%20training.pdf.
74 Letter from Rena Y. Kim to James Tucker, supra note 73.
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often search it incident to the arrest.7 5 Such a search often re-
veals considerable personal information about the possessor's
previous whereabouts, conversations, and associations, all of
which is information many people have previously considered
private.
Schools, in an attempt to fulfill their compelling interest in
a safe school community and the maintenance of a learning
environment, have recognized that students are using technol-
ogy at times to negatively affect that environment. Officials
understand and take advantage of this use to protect the envi-
ronment. For example, some school-based law enforcement and
school officials regularly access social networking sites of stu-
dents for a variety of reasons. On the one hand, a youth having
a school resource officer as a Friend or contact on his social
network site is considered a deterrent to online victimization
by adults. However, that "Friend" and law enforcement official
now has access to all the information on the student's social
networking site and possibly that of many of his contacts. Spe-
cifically regarding students, officials also access social network-
ing sites to interdict and prevent youth crime, such as uncover-
ing plans for a party where alcohol will be served or for a fight
between rival groups prior to such occurrences.76 Additionally,
school resource officers can become aware of past crimes such
as cyber-bullying or threats to school community.77 However,
such intrusions may allow government officials to examine
deeply personal matters such as diaries, location of students,
75 See infra p. 1064 and notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
76 Fox, supra note 72 (discussing how much underage drinking is promoted on such
social networking sites and documentation of such is later posted). The Boston Globe
reported that of twenty-two police departments, fourteen utilize social networking sites
for investigations, citing examples of locating missing teens, identifying a vandal who
caused $70,000 worth of damage, review for underage drinking parties, and brewing
fights in schools. Julie Masis, Predators Beware: Face on MySpace May Be Police De-
coy, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 8, 2009, at R3.
77 See Fox, supra note 72 and accompanying text. Michael Burnbaum, The Profile
Police, WASH. PosT, Apr. 6, 2009, at Al (discussing police using social networking sites
to "break up fights, monitor gangs, and thwart crime in what amounts to a new cyber-
beat").
10 54 [ V OL. 8 0:03
Privacy for Youth in a DigitalAge
personal information, and images, all without either procedure
or any level of suspicion.78
In this fast-changing digital environment, expectations of pri-
vacy among young people are shifting. . . . Revised expecta-
tions of privacy may have an implication for protections that
the Digital Native may receive under the law now and in the
future.79
Therefore, the impact of this shift in privacy can be great.
II. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
A. Justice Harlan's Two-Pronged Test
Currently, the analysis of modern Fourth Amendment
search doctrine begins with Katz v. United States,80 in which
the Supreme Court articulated a transition from a property
and trespass concept of government searches to a privacy-based
framework.8' In Katz, law enforcement placed a recording de-
vice on the outside of a public telephone booth and surrepti-
tiously recorded contents of Katz's conversations. The Court,
departing from the previously used trespass analysis, rejected
the parties' framing the legal issue as whether a public phone
booth was a "constitutionally protected area."82 Rather, the ma-
jority framed the legal issue as whether Katz knowingly ex-
posed information to the public or attempted to keep said in-
formation private. Articulating the new privacy basis, the
Court asserted that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not subject to Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as pri-
78 Burnbaum, supra note 77 (discussing chagrin of students who feel such monitor-
ing is an invasion of privacy); Sarah Randag, Police Use Social Networking to Target
Underage Lrinkers, A.B.A. J., Nov. 25, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
police-use-social-networkingjotarget-underage-drinkers/.
79 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 6, at 54.
8 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
81 Id. at 353.
82 Id.at 351.
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vate, even in an area accessible to the public may be constitu-
tionally protected." 83 However, this arguably ambiguous major-
ity opinion further stated that "the Fourth Amendment cannot
be translated into a general constitutional 'right of privacy.'
That Amendment protects individual privacy against certain
kinds of governmental intrusions, but its protections go fur-
ther, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all." 84 Some
scholars quite reasonably observed the ambiguity of the majori-
ty opinion.8 5
Seeking to clarify matters, Justice Harlan, concurring,
coined his famous two-pronged analysis. According to Justice
Harlan, the government engaged in a search when it examined
an area in which a suspect had a "reasonable expectation of
privacy."8 6 When this occurs, a search warrant (absent an ap-
plicable exception) must be obtained. The reasonableness of the
expectation is determined by analyzing the "two-fold require-
ment":
[F]irst that a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) ex-
pectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' Thus a
man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes
to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected' because no
intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the
other hand conversations in the open would not be protected
83 Id. (citations omitted). For an excellent discussion of the opinions and precedents
of Katz and White, see generally Catherine Hancock, Warrants for Wearing a Wire:
Fourth Amendment Privacy and Justice Harlan's Dissent in United States v. White, 79
MIss. L.J. 35 (2009).
84 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350; see also THOMAS CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 60 (2008) (noting that although Justice Stewart utilized
the word "privacy," he was clear that both no general right of privacy exists and that he
"explicitly refused to limit the protections afforded solely to a privacy analysis").
85 Hancock, supra note 83, at 52 and infra note 111 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the recognized and perhaps purposeful ambiguity of the majority opinion).
86 Subsequent cases have interchanged the objective prong to include a "legitimate
expectation of privacy" or a "justifiable expectation of privacy." See, e.g., Illinois v.
Andrews, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (legitimate); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (justifi-
able).
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against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under
the circumstances would be unreasonable.87
It is noteworthy that Justice Harlan's formula, unlike the
Katz majority, fully embraced "privacy" as the definition of
what the Fourth Amendment protects. In Smith v. Maryland,
the Court linked the subjective prong of the two-pronged test
with the majority's ambiguous privacy focus stating, "[t]he first
[prong] is whether the individual, by his conduct, has 'exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,' whether, in the
words of the Katz majority, the individual has shown that 'he
seeks to preserve [something] as private.' 88 Thus, to invoke the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, a person must first be
able to demonstrate, through his conduct, that he sought to
protect something as private. The implications of this require-
ment are particularly significant when considering youthful
attitudes toward technology and information sharing.
B. The Court Has Expressed Concern with the Two-Pronged
Test
Four short years after Katz, Justice Harlan89 expressed
concern about the application of his two-pronged test in his dis-
sent in United States v. White. As Justice Blackmun later did
in Smith v. Maryland,90 he proposed an alternative to Katz
when that test failed. In White, the police employed the use of
an informant who wore a device that transmitted to govern-
ment agents his conversations with White, which had occurred
in the informant's home and car, White's home, and a restau-
rant. 91 At trial, the government could not locate the informant
to testify, and the agents who conducted the surveillance testi-
fied as to the conversations. 92 In affirming admission of that
evidence, the plurality opinion held that White had assumed a
87 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
88 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (emphasis added) (quoting Katz,
389 U.S. at 361, 351) (citations omitted).
89 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90 See infra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
91 White, 401 U.S. at 745-47 (majority opinion).
92 Id. at 747.
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risk that the person in whom he confided was either not an in-
formant, or an informant with a transmitter.93 As such, the
Court concluded that the agents had not violated any legiti-
mate expectation of privacy when the informant transmitted
and agents monitored the conversations.
Harlan questioned this analysis. 94 In so doing, he chal-
lenged the plurality's position that there was no distinction
between agents monitoring conversations and undercover in-
formants participating in their conversations:
The force of the contention [that there is no distinction] de-
pends on the evaluation of two separable but intertwined as-
sumptions: first, that there is no greater invasion of privacy
in the third-party situation, and, second, that uncontrolled
consensual surveillance in an electronic age is a tolerable
technique of law enforcement, given the values and goals of
our political system.95
Regarding the plurality's use of the reasonable expectation of
privacy test, Justice Harlan questioned its utility and conceded
its limitations. He acknowledged that the current approach
"represent[s] an advance over the unsophisticated trespass
analysis of the common law," but stressed that "they too have
their limitations and can, ultimately, lead to the substitution of
words for analysis. The analysis must, in [his] view, transcend
the search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of
assumptions of risk."96
This caution, that the analysis not become a rote applica-
tion of words, seems to arise from an understanding that ex-
pectations of privacy are not just labels. He elaborated: "Since
it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror
and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expecta-
9 Id. at 752.
' First, he questioned the plurality's factual treatment equating the facts of White,
which involved third party monitoring, with the facts of Lewis and Hoffa, which in-
volved confidential informants relaying their conversations to law enforcement, or
Lopez, which involved a recording device on a government agent. Id. at 784-85 (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
9 Id. at 785.
9 Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
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tions and risks without examining the desirability of saddling
them upon society."97 Therefore, Justice Harlan articulated
that his approach in Katz may have "misconceived" the true
concern of the Fourth Amendment by focusing incorrectly on
the individual, rather than the impact of the practice on the
whole of society.98
Justice Harlan then offered an alternative when the two-
pronged test fails. The alternative is rooted in the Court engag-
ing in a more fundamental analysis of "examining the desira-
bility of saddling [such expectations] upon society."99 His solu-
tion is more than just an objective test of what society will ap-
prove. Rather, for him "[t]he critical question, therefore, is
whether under our system of government, as reflected in the
Constitution, we should impose on our citizens the risks of the
electronic listener or observer without at least the protection of
a warrant requirement."100 Harlan proposed answering this
question with a balancing test of "[1] assessing the nature of a
particular practice and [2] the likely extent of its impact on the
individual's sense of security [3] balanced against the utility of
the conduct as a technique of law enforcement."' 0 '
97 Id. (emphasis added). Scholars today echo this notion of the need to examine
more fundamental questions that an unreflective adherence to the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test allows. "[Tihe phrase 'reasonable expectation of privacy' is essen-
tially a legal fiction that masks a normative inquiry into whether a particular law
enforcement technique should be regulated by the Fourth Amendment." Orin Kerr,
Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1005, 1037 (2010).
98 White, 401 U.S. at 788 n.24 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99 Id. at 786.
100 Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion on Harlan's "should' question, see Han-
cock, supra note 83, at 76-78. Hancock describes a series of Harlan opinions as "re-
flect[ing] the view that the Katz expectations concept was a vessel that could be filled
with arguments that defined privacy based on artificial criteria resembling legal fic-
tions of the Olmstead regime." Id. at 89.
101 White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). This focus on individual security
hearkens back to early attempts by the Court to address the Fourth Amendment. For
example, in Boyd v. United States, the Court found an order compelling the production
of records violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted, "It is not the breaking of
his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the of-
fense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liber-
ty, and private property . . . ."Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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For Justice Harlan, the question became not simply
whether an individual had an expectation, but rather, whether
the Court should impose upon the citizenry the risk to their
security without Fourth Amendment protection. This analysis
was invoked by Justices Marshall and Brennan in their dissent
in Smith where Justice Marshall not only quoted Justice Har-
lan's discussion of "saddling" risks on society, but also chal-
lenged the assessment of risk approach by reminding that:
[W]hether privacy expectations are legitimate within the
meaning of Katz depends not on the risks an individual can
be presumed to accept when imparting information to third
parties, but on the risks he should be forced to assume in free
and open society. By its terms, the constitutional prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures assigns to the judiciary
some prescriptive responsibility.102
While Justice Blackmun later acknowledged Justice Har-
lan's cautionary note in his White dissent, Justices Marshall
and Brennan explicitly embraced Harlan's fundamental ap-
proach to "evaluate the 'intrinsic character' of investigative
practices with reference to the basic values underlying the
Fourth Amendment." 03
A decade after Katz, in Smith v. Maryland,104 Justice
Blackmun writing for the majority sounded a similar caution.
Justice Blackmun recognized situations in which the subjective
expectations of privacy prong would not suffice, and also of-
fered an alternative approach. Smith involved a case in which
law enforcement requested that the telephone company install
a device that recorded outgoing phone numbers dialed from
Smith's home, but not the content of the ensuing conversa-
tions. 105 The Court upheld this warrantless procedure partly
because it concluded that Smith had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the phone numbers dialed due to his awareness of
102 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1os Id. at 751.
1o4 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
105 Id. at 737.
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the numbers' exposure to the phone company. 10 6 However,
within this discussion, the Court recognized situations in which
the two-pronged test would not be applicable. After discussing
the two prongs, the Court stated that "[s]ituations can be im-
agined, of course, in which Katis two-pronged inquiry would
provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion."107
For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce
on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be
subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might
not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy re-
garding their homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a ref-
ugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation's
traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously
monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be
lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an individual's
subjective expectations had been "conditioned" by influ-
ences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment free-
doms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no
meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection was. In determining whether a "legi-
timate expectation of privacy" existed in such cases, a norma-
tive inquiry would be proper.108
Thus, the Court cautioned that the government could not
limit privacy expectations merely by announcing its intent to
spy on its citizens; if the government did so, the expectation-of-
privacy test would be inadequate, and a "normative inquiry"
would be necessary.109 But in predicting potential threats to
106 Id. at 743.
107 Id. at 741 n.5.
108 Id. (emphasis added).
109 The term "normative" can be somewhat ambiguous in that it is considered to
have two meanings. First, it is defined as "[e]stablishing or conforming to a norm or
standard." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1086 (8th ed. 2004). Second, it has also reflected,
not a societal standard, but what most of society actually does do: "actual. . . standard
determined by the typical or most frequent behavior." Id. Therefore, one meaning sug-
gests an inquiry into an authoritative standard, while the other suggests an inquiry
into the average or median standard of a group. Whichever was intended by Justice
20 11] 106 1
MISSISSIPPI LA WJOURNAL
privacy and Fourth Amendment protection, the Court did not
envision what appears to be happening today-that a substan-
tial segment of society would deliberately or unwittingly dimi-
nish its own right to privacy.
By and large, the Court has continued to apply Justice
Harlan's two-pronged test in Katz.n0 However, the Court has
also recognized flaws to this approach under certain circums-
tances or, in Justice Scalia's case, all circumstances.1 When
the test fails, Justice Blackmun counsels applying a strictly
normative approach. Justice Harlan proposed a more funda-
mental inquiry into the nature of a practice, its impact on the
individual's sense of security, and the utility of the practice.
C. In Pubhlic School Settings Students Have Limited Privacy
Rights
Before addressing whether today's youths' subjective atti-
tudes toward privacy have undermined their constitutional
protections, it is worth reviewing how the Supreme Court has
applied the Fourth Amendment to searches by public school
officials.112 While this line of cases is imperfect because it fo-
cuses on students, not youth more generally, it provides the
clearest lens through which to examine the implications of the
arguably distinct privacy expectations. The issue arises both in
suspicion-based searches and suspicionless searches. In both
Harlan, the question still remains: whose normative should be applied-all of society's
or a subset class's normative? How should that normative be measured?
110 E.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 338 (2000); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
11 Justice Scalia has written that the Katz test established only "that, unsurpri-
singly those 'actual (subjective) expectations of privacy' that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable,' bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy
that this Court considers reasonable. When that self-indulgent test is employed . . . to
determine whether a 'search or seizure' within the meaning of the Constitution has
occurred (as opposed to whether that 'search or seizure' is an 'unreasonable' one), it has
no plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment." Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
112 Since the Fourth Amendment protects against only government intrusions into
privacy, Fourth Amendment issues arise in school settings only in public schools;
searches by officials in private schools are not subject to Fourth Amendment standards
or restrictions.
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contexts the Court recognized that in a school setting, a
school's need to maintain order and discipline, and preserve the
learning environment necessarily diminishes a student's priva-
cy rights. 13
The Court first held that public school students are pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment on school property in New
Jersey v. T.L.O.114 In T.L. O., a school official searched T.L.O.'s
purse, having suspected her of smoking on campus. 115 In this
case, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment does
apply to searches conducted by school officials.116 However,
while at school, students do not enjoy the same degree of pro-
tection as adults. As a rule, to search an adult, a public official
must have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be
found, and, often, must obtain a search warrant before conduct-
ing the search. In T.L. O., the Court concluded that neither of
these requirements applied in the public school setting." 7 The
Court reasoned that the central requirement of the Fourth
Amendment is that a search or seizure must be "reasonable."118
Specifically, "what is reasonable depends on the context in
which the search takes place."119 In a public school context,
that determination is made by "balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails."120 For a school
setting, the Court determined that balance was between the
"substantial interest of teachers and administration maintain-
ing discipline in the classroom and on school grounds" and the
113 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
114 Id. at 325. When searching students, the doctrine of in loco parentis did not
isolate officials from the Fourth Amendment because they act as representatives of the
state. Id. at 336.
115 Id. at 328.
116 Id. at 333-34; see supra note 114 and accompanying text.
117 469 U.S. at 340-41 ('The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the
school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child
suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere
with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the
schools.").
11s Id. at 337.
119 Id
120 Id. (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
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students' interest in privacy. 121 Not only was a warrant unne-
cessary, but the Court lowered the level of suspicion necessary
for a search to be reasonable; probable cause was not required.
Rather, a court must determine the reasonableness of a search
with a two-fold inquiry. First, one must consider whether the
action was "justified at its inception." 22 A search is "justified at
its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the student has vi-
olated or is violating either the law or the rules of the
school."123 Second, the search actually conducted must be "rea-
sonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place." 124 This standard is met
when "the measures adopted are reasonably related to the ob-jectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infrac-
tion."125
T.L.O., therefore, confirmed that, although the Fourth
Amendment applies to students in a school search, students
have limited privacy rights in a school setting. School officials
are permitted to search students without probable cause or a
warrant. They can do so if the search is based on a reasonable
suspicion that it will produce evidence of violation of either a
criminal law or school policy and it is not excessive in scope
relating to the objective of the search and age or sex of the stu-
dent. In TL.O., school officials had a reasonable suspicion that
T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse and, therefore, looked
through it. The Court upheld this action as reasonable. 126
This conceptualization of students as a group who possess
decreased rights is apparent in the suspicionless search cases
as well. In 1995 and again in 2002, the Court held that where
121 Id. at 339-40. "[W]e have recognized that maintaining security and order in the
schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures." Id
(citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1975)).
122 Id. at 342 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
123 Id (emphasis added).
124 Id at 341.
125 Id at 342.
126 Id at 343-44 (validating a subsequent student search for cigarettes based on the
reasonableness of the original search).
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school officials could demonstrate that a significant drug prob-
lem existed within a school or a district and that less intrusive
measures had not or would be unlikely to address the problem,
it was reasonable to mandate that students could not partici-
pate in extracurricular activities unless the student and par-
ents agreed that some participants would be required to submit
urine samples for drug testing, under conditions that adequate-
ly protected the student's privacy and rigorously controlled in-
formation concerning test results.127 The Court explicitly arti-
culated that "the legitimacy of certain privacy expectations . . .
may depend upon the individual's legal relationship with the
state."128 Students in their "legal relationship with the state"
stand with a decreased expectation of privacy that is consi-
dered with the level of intrusion and balanced against the se-
verity of the need for school officials to search.129
The Court next considered a suspicion-based search of a
public school student in 2010, in Safford Unified School District
#1 v. Redding, where it departed from previous cases and ruled
in favor of the student. In Redding, school officials had received
information that students were bringing prescription medica-
tion to school for recreational consumption.130 The school had
previously had a student hospitalized for such abuse.'13 Infor-
mation linked the petitioner as a possible source of pills found
on school grounds.132 As a result, school officials not only
searched the petitioner's belongings, but subjected her to an
unconstitutional "strip search."133 An 8-1 majority held that,
even assuming school officials had reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve that a middle school girl possessed prescription strength
and over-the-counter medication, forcing her to submit to a
127 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1995); Bd. of Edue. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
128 Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 654 (upholding random drug testing procedure
for student athletes under the special needs exception to the warrant requirement).
129 Id. at 657.
130 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (2009).
131 Id. at 2648. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132 Id. at 2640 (majority opinion).
133 Id. at 2642-43.
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search only slightly less intrusive than a strip search was an
excessive intrusion into her privacy.134
While the Court announced no change in the standard, the
opinion offers some guidance regarding the Court's conceptua-
lization of students as a group and their expectations. First, the
Court indicated that a search has "reasonable grounds" if there
is a "moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing."135
This terminology of "moderate chance" appears to be an at-
tempt to more precisely describe the "reasonable grounds"
standard rather than to change the standard. Second, the
Court stated that Redding did have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the personal items she carried in her backpack. 136
This is not insignificant, particularly given how many youths
carry among their personal items cell phones or other mobile
electronic devices capable of storing and accessing nearly unli-
mited amounts of personal information. 37 Third, the Court
said that the strip search was an invasion of the girl's subjec-
tive expectation of privacy, in part because it was "inherent in
her account . . . as embarrassing, frightening and humiliat-
ing."138 Therefore, the intrusiveness of a search can be meas-
ured in part by the level of embarrassment and humiliation
caused. Fourth, the Court clearly conceptualized students as a
group. Although Redding involved a suspicion-based search of
one student, the Court drew at least one conclusion from her
status as a student. The Court noted that "[t]he reasonableness
134 Id. at 2643-44 (a strip search of a student violated the Constitution, but school
officials were entitled to qualified immunity). Previous school-search cases held in
favor of the school. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (deeming consti-
tutional a school policy that requires all students who participate in any extracurricu-
lar activity to undergo drug testing because the policy "is a reasonable means of fur-
thering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use
among its schoolchildren"); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995)
(holding school's policy, conditioning that student athletes participating in sports con-
sent to random drug testing, constitutional under Fourth Amendment inquiry); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343-44 (1985) (validating a subsequent student search
for drugs based on the reasonableness of the original search).
135 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2639 (emphasis added).
136 Id. at 2641 n.3.
137 See supra part I.A.
1'8 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2641.
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of her expectation . . . is indicated by the consistent experiences
of other young people similarly searched whose adolescent vul-
nerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the expo-
sure."139 Granted, the reasonableness of the expectation against
a near-strip search is easier to defend than the same expecta-
tion against a search of a cell phone. However, the Court's em-
phasis on the reasonable expectations of school children gener-
ally, as a distinct class with "adolescent vulnerability," provides
a useful perspective in evaluating the degree to which reasona-
ble expectations of privacy exist, and therefore, the justification
school officials should be required to demonstrate when invad-
ing them. Finally, Redding underscores a qualifying statement
the Court made in TL.0. which, until Redding, was at times
overlooked-that in measuring reasonableness, a court must
consider the "age and sex" of the student. 140 This aspect of the
test combined with (1) the fact that students possess a reason-
able expectation of privacy in personal possessions, and (2) that
the emotions experienced by the subject youth and the "consis-
tent experience" of similarly situated youth combine to create
an interesting result. One now has room to argue that the two-
pronged Katz test can be viewed through a lens of the unique
characteristics and common experience of students and youth
as a group. As such, the privacy norms of the group are rele-
vant and may derail the Katz test.
D. The Court Has Recognized the Role that Technology Can
Play in Reshaping Expectations of Privacy
As background to examining the hypothetical question
posed in this title, this article has reviewed the Katz test, the
Court's expressed reservations of the Katz test, and the Court's
articulations regarding students and their privacy. We now
turn to an analysis of the Court's statements regarding tech-
nology and the Fourth Amendment. The intermingling of ex-
pectations of privacy and technology has a long history. In their
historic 1890 piece, The Right of Privacy, Samuel Warren and
139 Id.
140 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
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Louis Brandeis recognized that the basic concept of the right to
privacy was dynamic, and technology affected that right: "Polit-
ical, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet
the new demands of society." 14 1 They too expressed concern
about technology, a.k.a., "modern enterprise and invention,"
which can increase the invasion on one's privacy subjecting its
members "to mental pain and distress."142
Technology affects privacy not only with regard to its use
by the government to surveil individuals, but also in the way
individuals use it in their daily lives. The Court has referenced
technology to both increase Fourth Amendment freedoms and,
more often, to restrict them. One reason the Katz Court aban-
doned its trespass analysis and embraced recognition of the
need to protect "intangible" conversations was the increased
importance of the telephone in daily life. 143 In Katz that recog-
nition contributed to the Court finding a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. In contrast, twenty years later, in California v.
Ciraolo,144 the Court cited public use of technological advances
to justify denying reasonable expectation of privacy in a defen-
dant's yard:
In an age where private and commercial flight in the public
airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect
that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected
from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of
1,000 feet.145
The Court, therefore, held that the flight, which was deli-
berately undertaken to look into the suspect's backyard, was
not a "search" at all. In essence the Court equated targeted
aerial surveillance over someone's home (and, later, in Riley v.
141 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
142 Id. at 196.
143 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) ("To read the Constitution more
narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication.").
144 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
145 Id. at 215.
1068 [ VOL. 80:03
2011] Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age 1069
Florida, a helicopter flight from 400 feet over a barn sur-
rounded by fences posted with "no trespass" signs) with seeing
into someone's yard from a public sidewalk. 146 These cases sup-
port the implication that when social custom and technology
make conceptualizing privacy problematic, 147 the Fourth
Amendment no longer affords any protection from government
use of that technology targeted at a specific location.148
On the same day as Ciraolo, the Court recognized in Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States that modern technology may
make aerial observation of curtilage invasive when it discloses
intimate associations otherwise imperceptible to police. 149 "In
common with much else, the technology of photography has
changed in this century. These developments have enhanced
industrial process and indeed all areas of life; they have also
enhanced law enforcement techniques."150 The Court later
stated in Kyllo v. United States that "[i]t would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the ad-
vance of technology."15 1
146 Id. at 213; Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
147 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215. The majority ignored the minimal likelihood that some-
one might randomly fly over Ciraolo's yard at 1,000 feet, would happen to look down,
recognize marijuana cultivation, figure out whose house it was, and report the matter
to the police. Id. at 223-24 (Powell, J., dissenting).
148 In its more recent case of direct use of technology for monitoring, the Court dis-
cussed the use of thermal imaging technology to monitor suspects within the home.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001). The opinion written by Justice Scalia,
a critic of the reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, did not analyze the technology
within that framework. Id. at 39. Rather, the Court noted that when the government
"uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without a physical intrusion, the surveillance
is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." Id. at 40.
149 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 n.3; Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227
(1986).
150 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 231.
151 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34. Justice Scalia frames the question presented to the
Court in Kyllo as "what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the
realm of guaranteed privacy." Id. at 34. Justice Brandeis previously articulated such
concerns noting that "[d]iscovery and invention have made it possible for the govern-
ment, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure
in court of what is whispered in the closet." Olmstead v. United States 277 U.S. 438,
473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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This approach has clear implications with regard to youths
and their mobile devices. A school official or prosecutor might
argue by analogy that although a diary was once considered
the most personal of documents, now with so many young
people keeping online diaries, shared with dozens or hundreds
of readers, government perusal of such should be considered
the equivalent of the overflights in Ciraolo and Riley, i.e., not
an intrusion into privacy at all. 152
In 2010 the Court declined the opportunity to rule broadly
on the reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages 153 on
an employee's work-issued alphanumeric pager. 154 In declining,
the Court recognized the dynamic world of technology, noting it
should "proceed with care" in part because "[tihe judiciary risks
error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment impli-
cations of emerging technology use before its role in society has
become clear."155 The Court recognized not only the dynamism
in the technology itself, but also in social norms: "Rapid
changes in the dynamics of communication and information
transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in
what society accepts as proper behavior."156
The Court is not alone in struggling to reconcile technolo-
gical changes and the Fourth Amendment. Scholars have par-
ticularly identified the need to adjust the traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis for the Internet and cyberspace.15 7 Pro-
fessor Kerr, for example, assumes a goal of "technology neutral-
152 LENHART ET AL., note 5, at i-ii, 7.
153 Text messages are messages in plain text sent through various devices both
wired and wireless. The most common implementation of text messaging is short mes-
sage service ("SMS"). This is how short messages can be sent to and from handheld
wireless devices including phones. NEWTON, supra note 4, at 1116.
154 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (presenting the question of the
expectation of privacy of both (1) the employee in his messages sent and received, and
(2) third parties in their messages sent to the employee's pager).
155 Id. at 2629.
156 Id. In the context of the specific issue of Quon, the Court noted that "[a]t present,
it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the law's treatment of them, will evolve." Id.
at 2630.
1s7 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 97; Adam Gershowitz, The iPhone meets the Fourth
Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27 (2008); Morgan Cloud, The Effect of Technology on
Fourth Amendment Analysis and Individual Rights, 72 MISS. L.J. 5 (2002).
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ity," i.e., "the degree of privacy the Fourth Amendment extends
to the Internet should try to match the degree of privacy pro-
tection that the Fourth Amendment provides the physical
world."s58 In so doing he analogizes the distinction in tradition-
al Fourth Amendment analysis of what is inside or outside con-
tainers to what is content and non-content in Internet commu-
nication, arguing for protection of content in Internet commu-
nications.15 9 Particularly with the Internet, Kerr criticizes the
use of the reasonable expectation of privacy test as failing to
"mirror widely shared social expectations."1 60 He concludes that
when the Court identifies a law enforcement practice it feels
should be regulated, it announces that there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and when the practice need not be regu-
lated, it announces that there is no expectation. Consequently,
"asking what privacy most Internet users expect does not accu-
rately represent the Katz test."16 ' Furthermore, with regard to
the rapidly changing technology today, courts likely should not
yet choose from emerging social attitudes.
Electronic communication technology in mobile media de-
vices such as the smartphone,162 iPhone, PDA,163 and laptop
158 Kerr, supra note 97, at 1007.
159 Id. at 1009-12.
16o Id. at 1037.
161 Id. at 1037-39.
162 A smartphone is a
cellular telephone with built-in applications and Internet access. Smart-
phones provide digital voice service as well as any combination of text mes-
saging, e-mail, Web browsing, still camera, video camera, MP3 player, video
player, television and organizer. In addition to their built-in functions,
smartphones have become application delivery platforms, turning the once
single-minded cellphone into a mobile computer.
PC Magazine Encyclopedia, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.comlencyclopediaterm/
0%2C2542%2Ct%3DSmartphone&i%3D51537%2C00.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
163 Otherwise known as a personal digital assistant, a PDA is
[a] handheld computer for managing contacts, appointments and tasks. It
typically includes a name and address database, calendar, to-do list and note
taker, which are the functions in a personal information manager. Wireless
PDAs may also offer e-mail and Web browsing, and data are synchronized be-
tween the PDA and desktop computer via USB or wireless. If the PDA in-
cludes a phone, it falls into the smartphone category.
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computer raise particular concerns about the traditional test.
For example, some acknowledge how current Fourth Amend-
ment law could allow access to volumes of information through
searches of cellular telephones and suggest altering legal rules
to limit such searches.164 Professor Cloud characterized the use
of the two-part test as a failure when it comes to technology
because the subjective prong has become irrelevant to the
Court. 6 5 He advocates for a new value-based theory of Fourth
Amendment protection with an approach emphasizing the
technological equivalent of physical trespass triggering Fourth
Amendment protections.166 All these solutions speak to the
problem of linking the Fourth Amendment to current technolo-
gies, as the technologies rapidly change and courts cannot un-
iformly remain informed of and in agreement with analogies.16 7
The current state of the Court's approach to what the
Fourth Amendment protects, at least outside the home, can
perhaps be summarized as follows. First, under this traditional
analysis a suspect must demonstrate by his actions a subjective
expectation of privacy and such an expectation must be one
that society is willing to endorse.168 Second, students have de-
creased privacy rights and the characteristics of their beha-
vioral norms are relevant. Third, although the Katz test was
PC Magazine Encyclopedia, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.comlencyclopedia-term/
0,2542,t=PDA&i=49021,00.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2010).
164 Gershowitz, supra note 157, at 27. In this piece, Gershowitz explores the options
of changing nothing; limiting searches incident to arrests to searches for evidence of
the crime of arrest; encouraging state legislatures to adopt more narrow statutes than
the rule in United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554 (10th Cir. 1992), which allows the
search of all personal items on arrest; limiting searches incident to arrest to only five
steps of intrusion; or distinguishing between information on a phone and outside it. Id.
at 45-57.
165 Cloud, supra note 157, at 28-29.
166 Id. at 44.
167 Eg., United States v. Bermudez, No. IP 05-43-CR-B/F, 2006 WL 3197181, at *13
(S.D. Ind. June 30, 2006) (rejecting a Kyllo challenge to using electronic devices to
locate cell phones because cell phones are used to transmit signals to parties outside
the home and thus their signals are "knowingly exposed to third part[ies], to wit, the
cell phone compan[ies]), afTd sub nom. United States v. Amaral-Estrada, 509 F.3d 820
(7th Cir. 2007).
168 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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first created to enhance privacy, as technology advances it has
almost always resulted in a minimizing of privacy expectations.
Applying the Katz approach to the emerging generation of
digital natives poses enormous problems. The problems derive
from many factors: technology itself, their youth, actions of
corporations controlling the technology, and the lack of judg-
ment common in adolescents. 169 Research demonstrates that
digital natives engage in somewhat risky behavior online and
have a false perception of privacy.170 The lack of complete de-
velopment of teenagers' prefrontal cortex impedes their ability
to evaluate risks and resist them.171 Therefore, they may not
manifest a subjective expectation of privacy similar to adults.
This failure to demonstrate a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy (at least one that society will recognize) may combine with
decreased privacy rights of at least public school students to
essentially create a "perfect storm" where under a traditional
analysis, youths' expectation of privacy is compromised. Thus,
the law may force an unforeseen scenario: the inapplicability of
the Katz test to a class of society, not through government ac-
tion, but citizen abandonment and corporate conditioning.
It is to this problem the article now turns. It is worrisome
that the Court would allow an entire class of citizenry fewer
Fourth Amendment protections based on the social norms of
their behavior when those norms are just that-normal for
their population. This is particularly troubling when that seg-
ment of the population has been recognized as less equipped to
appreciate privacy implications of their conduct and, therefore,
169 The Court has recognized, albeit in a very different context, that in particular,
"developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differ-
ences between juvenile and adult minds." Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026
(2010); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (juveniles' lack of ma-
turity makes them less deserving of severe punishment of death penalty).
170 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 6, at 166; Grimmelmann, supra note 28; Seounmi
Youn, Teenagers, Perceptions of Online Privacy and Coping Behaviors: A Risk-Benefit
Appraised Approach, 49 J. BROADCASTING & ELEC. MEDIA 86 (2005).
171 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 6, at 166; Grimmelmann, supra note 28, at 1179-
80 ("Later regret about initial openness is an especially serious problem for the most
active social network site users: young people."); LIVINGSTONE & BOBER, supra note 2,
at 15-16; see also, e.g., JONES & Fox, supra note 14; LENHART ET AL., supra note 5, at 2;
MCQUADE & SAMPAT, supra note 23, at 28-32.
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perhaps more in need of a judicial buffer between them and the
state. On the other hand, given that many youths arguably
seem to act differently about traditional privacy online, how
can the law plausibly rule that they nevertheless have a rea-
sonable expectation of it? The Katz test, therefore, may have
less utility than ever before.
III. WHAT IF SAVANA REDDING HAD A CELL PHONE? -
EXPLORING KATZ AND KATZ ALTERNATIVES.
Beginning with Justice Harlan's dissent in White, through
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Smith and culminating in the
majority opinion in Kyllo, the Court has shown that the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test is limited. Given that youth
as a group may have a fundamentally different understanding
of privacy than older generations, the question becomes wheth-
er we have reached a point where their "subjective expectations
have become 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized
Fourth Amendment freedoms" such that the analysis fails.172 If
so, what then the response? Several possibilities exist. First, a
traditional analysis could be applied resulting in either a forced
conclusion affording some rights to youth in spite of reality or a
stripping of privacy protections for this large segment of socie-
ty. These results are hardly desirous. Second, Justice Black-
mun's suggestion of a normative analysis could be followed.
Third, Justice Harlan's alternative test articulated in White
could be embraced.173 Each of these approaches has flaws,
which will be explored by applying them to an amended factual
premise of Redding, the Court's most recent school search case.
A. Factual Scenario
The hypothetical providing the vehicle through which to
examine these issues will be those of Redding, with some mod-
ifications to reflect current practices of school searches and cell
172 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979).
173 A fourth approach is possible in which an entirely new test for technology be
developed. Such a test is unwise in that tying laws to rapidly changing technology
results in quickly obsolete laws.
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phone policies. Here, this hypothetical assumes the school not
only has a policy strictly prohibiting the nonmedical use, pos-
session, or sale of any drug on school grounds, including "'[a]ny
prescription or over-the-counter drug, except those for which
permission to use in school has been granted."1 74 The hypothet-
ical also assumes the school has a policy, common among school
systems, prohibiting cell phone use at school, advising that
such phones will be confiscated if displayed on campus.' 75
In this hypothetical, one week before the search a student,
J.R., reported to the school's vice principal that other students
were bringing prescription drugs to recreationally consume at
school. 76 He further reported he had previously taken such a
pill from his classmate, which made him ill.177 This school has a
previous history of prescription medication abuse resulting in
at least one hospitalization.178
On the day of the search, J.R. gave school officials a pill of
prescription strength ibuprofen (400mg), which he claimed he
received from M.G.179 He further claimed that students were
planning to consume the pills at lunch.'80 Officials removed
M.G. from class. A day planner within M.G.'s reach was also
removed, which contained additional contraband including sev-
eral knives, lighters, a permanent marker, and a cigarette.181 A
razor blade, several white pills, and one blue pill (later identi-
fied as naproxen, an over-the-counter medication) were located
within M.G.'s possession.182 M.G. denied knowledge of the day
174 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (2009).
175 E.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(seizure of cell phone permissible as possession of phone on campus violated school
policy, but search was impermissible); Koch v. Adams, 2010 Ark. 131 (2010) (where
school district had policy of seizing cell phones for two weeks for possessing cell phone
in classroom); see also STUDENT DISCIPLINE LAw BULLETIN (West, 2010) (discussing an
Ohio school policy of phone confiscation if student violates ban of phone-use on cam-
pus).
176 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2640.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 2648 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
179 Id. at 2640 (majority opinion).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 2638, 2640.
182 Id. at 2640.
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planner but identified Susie Student (S.S.) as the source of the
pills.'83 Others confirmed that S.S. and M.G. were friendly. J.R.
identified S.S. as a student in whose house he had consumed
alcohol prior to a school dance. 184
The vice principal removed S.S. from her class and con-
fronted her with the day planner and its contents. S.S. admit-
ted ownership of the planner, but said she had lent it to M.G. a
few days earlier.185 She denied ownership of any of the pills, all
of which violated school policy.186 S.S. denied the vice princip-
al's accusation that she was going to distribute pills in school.
Officials searched her backpack and found nothing.' 7
Unlike the actual facts of Redding, assume S.S. had a
smartphone hooked onto her backpack that buzzed (indicating
incoming calls or texts) throughout her meeting with the vice
principal with increased frequency as the lunch hour ap-
proached. Given the information regarding the possible distri-
bution of pills at lunch, assume the vice principal took the
smartphone and (1) looked through the recent calls to deter-
mine if M.G. or other students (potential drug purchasers) were
trying to contact her; (2) examined her contacts list on her
phone to determine shared contacts with M.G. or J.R.; (3) re-
viewed recent texts to see if there were any drug related mes-
sages; and (4) pressed one button on the screen and accessed
her social networking account to determine if there were any
postings or messages as to the lunchtime drug consumption.
B. Options for Examining the School's Actions
1. Traditional Analysis is Unsatisfying
The proposed hypothetical includes many separate wrin-
kles that highlight some additional inadequacies of the Katz
analysis in this situation. Not only are there issues surround-
183 Id
184 Idat 2641.
185 Id.
186 1dat 2638, 2641.
187 Id. at 2641. The Supreme Court found sufficient suspicion to justify the search of
the backpack. Id. at n.3.
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ing youth, but also surrounding the scope and ability of the
reasonable expectation of privacy to be viable in a digital
age.188
a. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment
As a threshold matter, the inquiry must begin by deter-
mining whether the Fourth Amendment applies at all, i.e.,
whether examination of the phone, accessing the call log, ac-
cessing the contacts, and accessing the social networking site
were examinations into areas where a reasonable expectation
of privacy existed. Such an inquiry is fact-driven and done on a
case-by-case basis.189 A superficial application may find that
there is indeed a search. Significantly, the Redding Court con-
cluded that the student had an expectation of privacy in her
backpack as a personal container. 90 Therefore, the argument
would proceed, S.S. surely has such an expectation in her
phone as a personal container and, the government's examina-
tion of it constituted a search. As will be discussed below, al-
though the cell phone search cases are split as to the reasona-
bleness of the searches, almost all of these cases have found
that the expectation of privacy in the phone exists. 191
However, a more in-depth analysis indicates that whether
one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's phone or
text messages is far from clear. The Court did not resolve this
in Quon.192 Among the issues in Quon was whether a govern-
188 Kerr, supra note 97, at 1012-15 (noting that one important difference between
the physical and digital world is that the physical environment "limits the scale and
location of evidence" but the digital environments normally do not).
189 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 23 (1977) ("small variations in the facts
are determinative of the legal outcome"); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174,
178 (1972) ("[H]ere, as in nearly every case, facts are important.").
190 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 n.3 (2009).
191 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Boyd, 992 A.2d 1071, 1079 (Conn. 2010) (defendant had
reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone, but search permissible under automo-
bile exception). Compare United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007)
(implying a reasonable expectation of privacy but upholding search of cell phone inci-
dent to arrest by treating the phone as a container), with Ohio v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d
949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone iolated by
invalid search incident to arrest).
192 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629-30 (2010).
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ment employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in texts
(both sent and received) on his government-issued alphanu-
meric pager.193 An additional question was whether those who
sent him such messages also possessed an expectation that
they were private. 194 The Court opted not to address these
questions, and decided the case on the narrow grounds that the
examination of the messages was reasonable. In so doing the
Court explicitly stated it was too early to understand the priva-
cy expectations in text messages, not only because of the tech-
nology's effect on shaping privacy expectations, but also "the
degree to which society will be prepared to recognize those ex-
pectations as reasonable."19 5
This lack of clarity is apparent in cases that have ad-
dressed cell phone searches. While there are few published de-
cisions regarding searching cell phones on school property,
much less searches of smartphones, there have been analyses
of warrantless phone searches in other capacities, the most
common of which are cases dealing with the searching of cell
phones incident to arrest or consistent with other exceptions to
the warrant requirement.9 Courts are split on this issue and
1193 Id at 2630-31.
194 Id.at 2629-30.
"95 Id. at 2630-31. After Quon, the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit ruled that
federal law has not clearly established a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails
sent through a third-party Internet service provider. Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828
(11th Cir. 2010).
196 It should be noted that many cases discussing searches of cell phones incident to
arrest predate or omit the relevance of Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009), in
which the Court limited the search of a vehicle incident to arrest, and perhaps all
searches incident to arrests, to searches for evidence of the crime of arrest or for officer
safety. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 952 (Ohio 2009) ("[W]hen the interests in
officer safety and evidence preservation are minimized, the court has held that this
exception no longer applies."); United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL
5381412, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (same). Of course, courts have analyzed cell
phone searches in contexts other than incident to arrest. See Connecticut v. Boyd, 992
A.2d 1071, 1076 (Conn. 2010) (search of incoming numbers on cell phone valid under
automobile exception to warrant requirement); People v. Chho, 2010 WL 1952659, at
*4 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2010) (same); Lemons v. Texas, 298 S.W.3d 658, 662 (2009)
(approving search of phone photos based on consent suggested when defendant handed
phone to officers after their request "to see the phone" and concluding neither Park nor
Finley applied); Wall, 2008 WL at *4 (rejecting government arguments of exigency or
inventory search in addition to rejecting search incident to arrest argument); United
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the fault line in this division depends on the court's conceptua-
lization of the cell phone. Those courts that consider phones as
containers capable of holding other containers generally allow
the searches. Those that consider phones items that themselves
access vast personal information do not. 197
A leading case for a conception of cell phones as merely
containers, and one of few circuit court decisions on this issue,
is United States v. Finley.198 In Finley the police searched the
defendant's work-issued cell phone incident to his narcotics
arrest, examining his phone, call log, and text messages. 199 The
court found nothing special about the fact that the item ex-
amined was a cell phone and treated it as a container on one's
person and, therefore, searchable without any additional justi-
fication at arrest.200 In the early cell phone cases, many courts
followed suit. 201
States v. James, No. 1:06CR134 CDP, 2008 WL 1925032, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2008)
(allowing search of cell phone under the automobile exception, but rejecting arguments
based on consent and exigent circumstances); New York v. McGee, No. 2006NY047717,
2007 WL 1947624, at *6 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. June 29, 2007) (rejecting search of photos on
phone based on inventory search).
197 For a discussion of these differing conceptualizations of some electronic devices
as containers or not, see U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SECTION, SEARCHING & SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 3-4, 33 (2009).
198 United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding search
of cell phone as incident to arrest). The same circuit later rejected a search of a cell
phone incident to arrest because the arrest was not valid. United States v. Zavala, 541
F.3d 562, 575-76 (5th Cir. 2008). Zavala has language differing from Finley and its
conceptualization of the cell phone. Zavala recognized that "cell phones contain a
wealth of private information including emails, text messages, call histories, address
books, and subscriber numbers," calling them "similar to a personal computer that is
carried on one's person." Id. at 577. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit fol-
lowed Finley. United States v Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 413 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming
denial of motion to suppress evidence from cell phone).
199 Finley, 477 F.3d at 254.
200 Id. at 259-60.
201 Eg., United States v. Deans, 549 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 2008); United
States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) (al-
though agreeing with Finley, noting the privacy concerns articulated in United States
v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2007), were not impli-
cated because the officer limited his search to call history and did not search voicemails
or text messages); United States v. Dennis, No. 07-008-DLB, 2007 WL 3400500, at *7
(E.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 2007) (upholding search of cell phone history log as consistent with
Finle); United States v. Mercado-Nava, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1277-79 (D. Kan. 2007)
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At the same time another view of cell phones emerged, ar-
ticulated first in the unpublished opinion of the Northern Dis-
trict of California in US. v. Park.202 Factually, Park was not
the strongest case for the government in that the police could
not recall when they searched the cell phone's address book.203
In rejecting that this was a search incident to arrest because it
was not contemporaneous to arrest, the district court articu-
lated a view of the cell phone as distinct from an ordinary con-
tainer:
[M]odern cellular phones have the capacity for storing im-
mense amounts of private information. Unlike pagers or ad-
dress books, modern cell phones record incoming and outgoing
calls, and can also contain address books, calendars, voice and
text messages, email, video and pictures. Individuals can
store highly personal information on their cell phones and can
record their most private thoughts and conversations
through email, and text, voice, and instant messages. 204
This conceptualization of the cell phone has more recently
been shared by many courts who favor this understanding of
the cell phone as potentially highly personal.205 One of the
clearest discussions of this issue was made in Ohio v. Smith,
where the Ohio Supreme Court analyzed the court split, con-
(upholding search of cell phone that involved the downloading of memory and the ac-
cessing of stored numbers).
202 Park, 2007 WL 1521573.
203 Id. at *3 (police agreed that phone was searched at least at the time of invento-
ry).
204 Id. at *8, see also Gershowitz, supra note 157, at 29 ("[The iPhone is a handheld
wireless device that functions as a cell phone, BlackBerry, camera, music player, and
video player, while simultaneously providing Internet access."). Gershowitz argues that
the iPhone changes everything because of its capability of storing tremendously more
information, as well as its ability to access additional information. Id. at 41-42.
205 E.g., State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 953 (Ohio 2009) (rejecting Finley and em-
bracing Park in a search based on those particular facts); United States v. Quintanua,
594 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (citing to Zavala and rejecting search of
photographs on phone as not justified under the dual rationale of officer safety and
evidence preservation); United States v. Wall, No. 08-60016-CR, 2008 WL 5381412, at
*3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2008) (Court "declines to adopt the reasoning of Finlej' and the
analogy between pagers and cell phones in which evidence of incoming phone numbers
could be lost if not immediately preserved, in favor of a Park analysis).
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cluding that courts that treated cell phones like containers
were immersed in old, outdated technology. 206 The Ohio Su-
preme Court further acknowledged this tension between treat-
ing cell phones as small computers or as ordinary containers:
"Given their unique nature as multifunctional tools, cell phones
defy easy categorization. . . . Their ability to store large
amounts of private data gives their users a reasonable and jus-
tifiable expectation of a higher privacy in the information they
contain."2 0 7 This court recognized the "continuing rapid ad-
vancements in cell phone technology" in smartphones and their
capability to both store large amounts of data as well as access
the Internet.208 In so doing, this court also rejected any re-
quirement that officers discern the capability of cell phones
before acting.209 Notably, a four justice dissent rejected this
analysis and embraced the concept of the two circuit court opi-
nions in Finley and Murphy1 o that applied traditional Fourth
Amendment principles asserting that a cell phone's digital ad-
dress book is akin to traditional address books carried on the
person.2 1 1
Notwithstanding these differing conceptions of cell phones
in the case law, a shared recognition emerges from the cases:
all cell phone searches are not equal. It is highly relevant ex-
actly what the police examine on the phone. It matters if the
police simply review the address book located on the phone, or
access photos, text messages, or the Internet. In this hypotheti-
cal, S.S.'s expectations of privacy may vary between the num-
bers that appear on the screen during incoming calls and a
password protected social networking site not actually located
on the phone. 212
206 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954.
207 Id. at 955.
208 Id. at 954.
209 Id.; see also United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 412 (4th Cir. 2009).
210 Mlurphy, 552 F.3d at 412 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of motion to suppress
evidence from cell phone).
211 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 957. (Cupp, J., dissenting).
212 Drawing a legal distinction between information physically located on or off the
cell phone is likely an unwise choice, given that technology seems to be moving in the
direction of "cloud" computing. With cloud computing, the actual data is physically
located in a remote location and the device simply provides access to information stored
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To further complicate matters, the conceptualization of the
cell phone is anything but static. For example, even if one were
to embrace a Park analysis that phones are special due to their
ability to hold vast data, as technology has advanced, the abili-
ty to remove this data from phones may allow for police to
search them due to this new exigency. 213 Technological ad-
vances create new exigencies. The Computer Crime & Intellec-
tual Property Section of the United States Department of Jus-
tice (CCIPS) and some courts have cited the ability of some
phones to receive "a kill command. . . that will cause the device
to encrypt itself or overwrite data stored on the device." 214
However, the fact that this technology exists surely cannot al-
ways create an exigency. 215 On the other hand, what burden
will be on law enforcement to determine whether this remote
on a remote server. Shari Claire Lewis, Cloud Computing Brings New Legal Chal-
lenges, LAW.COM (July 8, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432062900.
While the definition of cloud computing remains less defined, it "involves the sharing or
storage by users of their own information on remote servers owned or operated by
others and accessed through the Internet or other connections." ROBERT GELLMAN, THE
WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, PRIVACY IN THE CLOUDS: RISKS TO PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY FROM CLOUD COMPUTING 4 (2009). Examples include video sites,
photography sites, webmail such as Hotmail, Google Docs, etc. Id.; Alan Wernick, A
Legal Fog, CHICAGO LAW., May 2009, at 49.
213 See, e.g., John Boudreau, Get Ready for 3G: Apple Adds New Functions, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS (July 7, 2008, 1:34 AM), http://chetansharma.com/blog/2008/
07/07/iphone-3g-has-business-appeal.html (discussing how 3G iPhone supports "remote
wipe" or the ability to instantly remove data remotely).
214 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 197, at 30. United States v. Young, Nos.
5:05CR63-01-02, 2006 WL 1302667, at *13 (N.D. Wash. May 9, 2006) (exigent circums-
tances justified searching a cell phone for text messages where the cell phone had an
option for auto deleting messages after one day); United States v. Valdez, No. 06-CR-
336, 2008 WL 360548, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) (search of phone's address book
and call history reasonable because, among other reasons, testimony from law en-
forcement indicated that the cellular provider enabled customers to remotely delete all
of the information located on the cell phones); see also David C. Morrison, Behind the
Lines, CONG. Q.: HOMELAND SECURITY, May 2010 (quoting CDNet, "A remote wipe
feature on Blackberry and iPhone smartphones protects privacy but 'also allows the
accomplices of criminals and terrorists captured by law enforcement remotely to erase
all incriminating and intelligence-related data.").
215 See United States v. David, 756 F. Supp. 1385, 1392 n.2 (D. Nev. 1991) (rejecting
government argument that exigent circumstances support searching battery-operated
computer because agent did not know how long batteries would last).
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deletion ability is on the device in question?216 To further com-
plicate matters, some have noted that cell phones almost never
have an exigency because cell phone providers keep records of
calls and contents of text messages for at least a few weeks,
which can be preserved and retrieved.217
While most of these cases have found at least a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the phone, the Supreme Court has
declined to rule directly. In this hypothetical, one could argue
that S.S. did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy to
the phone because she brought it to school aware of the school
policy that if left on and in use, it could be confiscated by offi-
cials. She did not demonstrate a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy. However, pending threatened and actual litigation in
analogous school searches (in which schools have seized cell
phones due to the infraction of the cell phone policy and went
on to search them) raises the question as to whether the know-
ledge of the policy to seize phones waives the right to protect
them from search. 218
Even if school officials could establish that S.S. lacked a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone, the cases above
demonstrate that what is searched matters significantly. Offi-
cials in our hypothetical reviewed incoming phone calls, con-
216 United States v. Murphy, 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting arguments
that police must ascertain storage capacity of phone prior to searching it).
217 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955-56 (Ohio 2009) (rejecting the ar-
gument that the possibility of permanent deletion of cell phone records yields exigency
for a search: "even if one accepts the premise that the call records on Smith's phone
were subject to imminent permanent deletion, the State failed to show that it would be
unable to obtain call records from the cell phone service provider, which might possibly
maintain such records as part of its normal operating procedures"); Mathew Orso,
Cellular Phones, Warrantless Searches, and New Frontier of American Jurisprudence,
50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 183, 199 (2010).
218 Scott S mith, Cell Text Snooping Dra ws Ire: Linden School Changes Policy After
Incident, THERECORDNET.COM (Apr. 18, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.recordnet.coml
apps/pbes.dll/article?AID=/20080418/ANEWS/804180326/-1/ANEWSO4 (school an-
nounces change in policy after teacher seized cell phone and then read three weeks
worth of text messages and the ACLU challenged the policy); Sue Lindsay, Boulder
District OK's Cell Phone Search Limits, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Apr. 22,
2008, 12:05 AM), http://www.rockymountainnews.comlnews/2008/apr/22/boulder-
district-oks-cell-phone-search-limits.html (school reaches agreement with ACLU to not
review contents of confiscated cell phones unless imminent risk to public safety).
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tacts, and text messages. They also pressed one button to
access S.S.'s social networking site.219 The social networking
site and email accounts presumably have passwords associated
with them if accessed in a "normal" way from a computer.
However, assume S.S., like many others, created an unimpeded
shortcut to these accounts through one button on her phone.
Typically the presence of a password can indicate a subjective
expectation of privacy. 220 However, the government could argue
that the creation of a one button method to bypass the pass-
word, combined with bringing the cell phone to a school setting
knowing it could be accessed if seized, may be enough to estab-
lish a failure to exhibit an expectation of privacy.
This assumes the social networking site has limited
access. However, privacy settings on such sites can be mislead-
ing and can cause youth to believe access is limited to con-
219 Some smartphones provide mechanisms for accessing information on the Inter-
net with the touch of an icon or button, circumventing a password.
220 United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225-26 (D.P.R. 2002) (no
reasonable expectation of privacy in photo on webpage "without taking any measures
to protect the information"), remanded on other grounds 90 F. App'x 3 (1st Cir. 2004).
But cf Brown-Criscuolo v. Wolfe, 601 F. Supp. 2d 441, 449-50 (D. Conn. 2009) (conclud-
ing that a principal had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her personal email
communication on her office computer, a prime rationale being that the computer was
password-protected and no third parties had access to her computer); United States v.
Rosario, 558 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727-27 (E.D. Ky. 2008) (no reasonable expectation of
privacy when one takes no safeguards to protect the computer contents, such as utiliz-
ing a password shield restricting access to third parties); United States v. Heckencamp,
482 F.3d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007) (the government conceded that Heckencamp
had a subjective expectation of privacy and the court held that an objectively reasona-
ble expectation existed "in his personal computer, which was protected by a screen-
saver password, located in his dormitory room, and subject to no policy allowing the
university actively to monitor or audit his computer usage"); United States v. Barrows,
481 F.3d 1246, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2007) (giving great weight to fact that defendant did
not "password protect his computer, turn it off, or take any other steps to prevent third-
party use," thus rejecting a reasonable expectation of privacy claim); United States v.
Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184, 1189-90 (9th Cir. 2007) (password protected computers are
sufficient for a finding of subjective expectation of privacy and a locked office in the
workplace constituted a reasonable expectation in that space); Trulock v. Freeh, 27
F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001) (a reasonable expectation of privacy in password-
protected computer files is analogous to a locked footlocker, which cannot be searched
without a warrant or consented to a search by a third party).
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tacts.221 Similarly, some courts have found no expectation of
privacy in photos posted online.222 These facts could indicate
that the information obtained by school officials was publicly
available. However, the fact that equivalent information can be
obtained by other means does not make an unlawful search
lawful. 223
In the end, the traditional Katz analysis of privacy expec-
tation creates more questions than answers. Although a cur-
sory analysis suggests an expectation of privacy, deeper review
of cell-phone-search case law combined with technological ad-
vancements allows litigants much leeway in arguing even that
issue. This could result in exposing private information, even
password protected information, to law enforcement review.
b. Even Ifa Search, Under TLO's and Redding's Decreased
Standards, Significantly Little Protection For S.S. May Exist
One could argue that the outcome of the above analysis is
without significance because, while this is an unreasonable
search of an adult, TL.0. and Redding do little to protect stu-
dents from such an intrusion. TL.O. is an older case and Red-
ding offered no significant alteration of TL. O.'s standard.
However, youths' sense of privacy may be altered more today
than in the past not so much because of a weakening of legal
protections post- TL. 0., but because the amount of information
available to a school official engaged in the lawful search has
grown significantly. As Professor Kerr points out, the differ-
ence between the physical world and the digital world is that
"physical environments generally limit the scale and location of
evidence but digital environments normally do not."2 2 4 Thus,
the privacy invasion felt by T.L.O. and Redding was physically
limited to what could be fit within the purse or backpack re-
221 Grimmelmann, supra note 28, at 1160. ("The social dynamics of social network
sites do more than just give people reason to use them notwithstanding the privacy
risks. They also cause people to misunderstand those risks.") Id. at 1164; see also supra
note 56 and accompanying text.
222 Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225-26.
223 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30, 35 n.2 (2001).
224 Kerr, supra note 97, at 1012-15.
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spectively. 225 Because these were limited by physical bounda-
ries, the decreased privacy rights, decreased necessary suspi-
cion, and lack of a warrant requirement can be seen as on bal-
ance with the compelling need of the school officials to main-
tain order and discipline. However, when these same decreased
standards now allow access to a vast array of personal informa-
tion, the unsatisfactory outcome of this standard becomes more
apparent.
The first step in analyzing a student search under a tradi-
tional analysis is to determine if the examination of the phone
was justified at its inception. This examination encompasses
reviewing S.S.'s call history, text messages, address book, and
her social networking site. To do so, officials must have a rea-
sonable suspicion that these activities will yield evidence of
violation of the law or school rule.226 As phrased in Redding, a
"moderate chance" must exist that such evidence will be
found.227 Given that there is credible information that within
the hour students will be meeting and ingesting prescription
medication, that S.S. was linked to this activity by two stu-
dents (one of whom appears to both be friends with S.S. but
also has a self-interest in inculpating S.S.), and that S.S. ac-
knowledged ownership of the day planner and lending it to
M.G., there appears a "moderate chance" that her cell phone,
now repeatedly receiving calls or text messages just prior to the
appointed distribution time, contains evidence of a violation of
school policy. Similarly, the pattern of calls may also provide
information about who else is involved, or may corroborate her
relationship with the other two students. 228 Received texts and
announcements on her social network site or wall posts all
225 That is not to say the search of her person was not invasive because it also was
limited to her person. Invasions of privacy in the physical world certainly can be se-
vere. Such is why Redding noted that a strip search is in a unique category of its own
due to its nature. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641-42
(2009).
226 Newdersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985).
227 Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2639.
228 Eg, People v. Chho, No. CC822335, 2010 WL 1952659, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May
17, 2010) (probable cause to search cell phone existed in the totality of circumstances
where presence of illegal drugs was coupled with continuous ringing of telephone).
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have a moderate chance of yielding evidence as research indi-
cates that this is a primary way in which youth communicate
and arrange their social lives. 2 2 9 Consequently, such a low
standard, combined with technological vulnerabilities and vo-
lume of information, may create the unintended consequence of
a loss of protections for access to diaries, interpersonal commu-
nication with unrelated parties, and personal data and photo-
graphs.
The next step is to review whether the search was intru-
sive in light of the age or sex of the student.230 Here age is most
relevant. As has been demonstrated, some studies suggest that
youth can be more liberal in sharing personal information by
conceptualizing the risks to exposing such information diffe-
rently. Therefore, what may be perceived as excessively intru-
sive to a digital immigrant may not to a younger person. Fur-
thermore, research suggests the age of the student does matter
as older students are more interactive on cell phones than
younger students.231 This could mean that in light of one's age,
one's expectation of privacy is very different for youth and the
actions appear less intrusive. It is this reality that could risk
the demise of legally recognized privacy for youth as society
knows it.
The answer to the intrusiveness question is very much
connected to exactly what was searched. One published opinion
involving a school search of a cell phone, whose holding was
limited to denying the school district summary judgment in a
civil suit, held that the search exceeded the allowable scope. In
Klump v. Nazareth School District,2 3 2 school officials seized a
student's cell phone when he was observed with it in violation
229 AMANDA LENHART & MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,
TEENS, PRIVACY & ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS 6 (2007), available at http://www.pew
trusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Society-and-theInternet/PIPTee
ns PrivacySNS Report Final.pdf (detailing the frequency of Internet use by teenag-
ers and noting that social network sites as a communication tool is the primary reason
for joining).
230 While sex seems less relevant than in the context of the actual case, research
indicates that girls Redding's age are more likely to post information online and com-
municate with others. See supra note 43.
231 See MCQUADE & SAMPAT, supra note 23, at 32.
232 425 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
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of the school policy. 233 School officials then accessed the phone's
directory to obtain numbers of other students and called them
to determine whether they would violate school policy by ans-
wering their cell phones on campus.234 As if that were not
enough, officials then accessed voicemail and text messaging
functions, at one point conversing with Klump's brother with-
out properly identifying themselves. 235 At some point a text
arrived on the phone indicating possible drug activity, but the
parties disputed when that occurred. 236 At the summary judg-
ment stage, the court was bound to view the facts in favor of
Klump. 237 As such, the court found that the seizure of the
phone was justifiable. 238 However, accessing the directory and
the calls were not justifiable under T.L. 0. because such activity
was designed to find evidence of other students' misconduct for
which they had no reasonable belief was occurring. 239
In contrast, in this hypothetical an argument may be
made that the calls within the last hour could lead to evidence
of a violation. However, searching older text messages or call
logs may exceed what is necessary. Similarly, searching all of
S.S.'s contacts may also be excessive in scope. Finally, access to
social networking may at first seem intrusive. However, when
one recalls the research that girls are most likely to create con-
tent online, that youth are less likely to protect it from public
view, and that social networking sites are a primary method of
scheduling and tracking contacts, the scope may not be exces-
sive. Finally, given that S.S.'s phone is a smartphone, the po-
lice may be able to establish an exigency to do a more intrusive
search for fear of the "kill order."
While the result of such a motion may be unclear under a
traditional analysis, it would seem that the combination of the
low standard in T.L.O. combined with the decreased privacy
rights and understandings of privacy for these youth, may
233 Id. at 630.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id at 631, 639.
237 Id
238 Id at 640.
239 Id
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combine to allow access to vast amounts of personal data and
diminish a privacy expectation for a large class of people.
2. Justice Harlan's Fundamental Approach
Justice Harlan recognized the acceptance of his two-part
test. He cautioned, however, against a "substitution of words
for analysis."240 Therefore, he felt the law should translate not
only rules and customs, but also "values," thus forcing the
Court to not only recite expectations, but ultimately to examine
"the desirability of saddling [burdens] upon society."241
For Justice Harlan, his inquiry would begin with the thre-
shold question of whether under the Constitution and system of
government, society should impose upon students the risks of
invasion into their cell phones or other digital media without
procedural protections. 242 This is determined by (1) assessing
the nature of the practice; (2) assessing its likely impact on the
individual's sense of security; and (3) balancing that against
the utility of the conduct.243
The nature of the practice must be broken into the differ-
ent examinations. In this hypothetical, the nature of school of-
ficials examining the outside of the phone and incoming calls is
distinct from pressing at least one button to further examine
the call log, taking an additional step to review text messages,
or pressing an icon to gain access to a social networking site.
Each of these practices can be considered a step further into
the suspect's private phone. 244 While the Court has recognized
the special nature of the school's relationship with students
and the "substantial interest" in maintaining discipline on
school grounds, 245 one might find the nature of this practice of
examining phones for information of impending drug consump-
tion on school property inherently reasonable. However, as the
school official accesses additional information stored in the
240 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Gershowitz, supra note 97, at 45-57.
245 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985).
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phone, and then on S.S.'s social networking site, the intrusion
becomes more attenuated from the valid interest in maintain-
ing a learning environment in the school.
As to the second prong, the presence of a school policy af-
fects the impact these different examinations have on the indi-
vidual. If a youth has advance notice as to the likelihood of her
cell phone being searched on school property, then she is af-
forded the opportunity to avoid the possibility of such an intru-
sion by avoiding the use of a cell phone on campus. However, if,
such as in Klump, the policy is only for cell phone use (here
arguably S.S. was not using her phone; others were leaving her
messages), and allows only for seizure of the phone and not its
search, it is likely that there is a significant impact on S.S.'s
sense of security. This impact may or may not grow as to the
social networking examination. If she has put in place pass-
word protections or limited access to this site, the impact on
her sense of security is great. However, if the information on
that site is available for the public to see, query whether the
fact that her phone was used to gain access to publically avail-
able information creates a privacy expectation that did not oth-
erwise exist.
These fact-driven concerns must be balanced against the
third prong: the utility of this conduct. Here an argument can
be made to support all sides. School officials correctly point out
that some students facilitate violations of school regulations
and laws through social networking sites. They plausibly argue
they would be remiss in failing to recognize that and, thus, ex-
plore such sites in their effort to maintain a safe learning envi-
ronment. In the S.S. example, presented with the possibility
that several students will soon be ingesting prescription medi-
cation, one could argue that perhaps there is utility is search-
ing the phone and text traffic directly preceding the event. On
the other hand, S.S. could reasonably argue that the sudden
burst of calls was prompted by her removal from class and that
her presence in the vice principal's office is more likely the
source of this traffic. She could further argue that because the
information officials seek can be obtained by a warrant to her
cell phone company, there is no utility in this practice. This
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argument would have more force if there were no impending
event.
Justice Harlan's approach does not lead to a decisive an-
swer. It is as fact-driven as the traditional analysis but a better
approach because it asks the right questions, i.e., whether this
should be done. Furthermore, it increases protections for a
compromised class by examining the fairness and propriety of
an invasion of privacy without a warrant. Such an approach,
while imperfect, does offer a more reasoned analysis of the im-
plications of "saddling" youth with such a security challenge.
3. Justice Blackmun's Normative Approach
A majority of the Court in Smith v. Maryland recognized
that circumstances can occur in which an individual's subjec-
tive expectation "has been 'conditioned' by influences alien to
well recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms" and that when
such occurs, the subjective expectations should have little or no
role in ascertaining the scope of Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.246 According to Justice Blackmun, when such a situation
arises, the Court should engage in a "normative inquiry" to de-
termine the validity of the governmental action.
The apparent simplicity of this solution is belied by the
necessary inquiry. As a threshold matter, one must determine
if this is such a situation where expectations have been condi-
tioned in such a way as Justice Blackmun describes. To reach
Blackmun's analysis, our hypothetical assumes that S.S. has
no subjective expectation of privacy because she came to school
with a cell phone displayed and lacking password protection,
and the information placed on her social networking site is
available to at least some third parties. 247 However, that would
not end the inquiry. Has she been conditioned to think in this
way? One might argue that she has been so conditioned, based
on her youth and her status as a digital native for whom tech-
246 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979).
247 That is not to say this is the correct conclusion. This is merely assumed to allow
examination of Blackmun's approach in situations where Katz fails.
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nological sharing of information-sometimes at her own risk-
is the natural order.
Unlike the situation that Justice Blackmun warned
against-that the government could reduce subjective expecta-
tions merely by announcing its intent, and then exploit those
reduced expectations by acting on its announced intention 248 -
S.S.'s "conditioning," assuming it exists, was not directly
caused by the government. Rather, she and her age cohort,
through their differing conceptions of privacy, have arguably
conditioned themselves to forego some traditional privacy pro-
tections. Or, one could argue they have been conditioned in this
regard by the companies who collect and sell their informa-
tion. 24 9 Either way, they have done so despite warnings from
teachers and other public employees to limit their exposure
online. 250 Consequently, just as the defendant in Smith, youth
arguably choose to utilize the Internet and manage their priva-
cy in ways that produce known privacy compromises.
Even assuming that this conditioning of youth sufficiently
compromises their subjective expectation of privacy, the next
step, this normative inquiry, is not without challenges. 251 First,
whose normative should be used? The fundamental problem
society may be facing is not the isolated diminished expectation
of privacy of an individual, but that of an entire class of people.
For an individual, one can more easily examine what general
social norms are. Regarding a class, however, it is unclear
whose normative applies. It is nearly impossible to isolate or
justify the norms of one class as the measure. For example, it is
difficult to imagine the propriety of a different privacy stan-
dard between the wealthy and poor; professional and laborer;
or young and old. A second approach is to attempt to measure
broader societal norms. Doing so could lead to minimizing
248 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 n.5 (offering examples such as the government announc-
ing that all homes will be subject to warrantless entry or that a refugee from a totalita-
rian country assumes the government continuously monitors him).
249 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
250 See generally Protecting Youths in an Online World: Hearing before the S Sub-
comm. on Consumer Protection and the Comm. On Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV).
251 See supra note 109 for a discussion about "normative."
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youth's norms from that calculus. With youth's actual expe-
riences excluded from the process, the analysis creates a false
sense of what "society" is willing to accept. In essence it would
be excluding from an alleged normative analysis what the ma-
jority of users online expect.
The final problem with such an approach is that there
seems to be no general understanding today of cell phone, text
message, and social networking privacy. Americans have occu-
pied houses with yards for generations, giving courts a firm
basis on which to assess societal expectations of privacy in con-
nection with them in Ciraolo or sealed letters in Jackson.252
However, courts have struggled with exactly what society is
willing to recognize when it comes to electronic media as it is
now, before societal expectations have been established. Fur-
thermore, in 2010 the Supreme Court declined to make any
broad judgments regarding expectations of privacy in text mes-
sages because the issue reached the Court "before its [the
emerging technology] role in society has become clear." 253 This
lack of clarity is aggravated by the fact that society is trying to
come to terms with a moving target of much more rapidly de-
veloping technology. "Rapid changes in the dynamics of com-
munication and information transmission are evident not just
in technology itself, but in what society accepts as proper beha-
vior. . . . At present it is uncertain how. . . norms, and the law's
treatment of them, will evolve." 254 Therefore, Blackmun's ap-
praisal has significant shortcomings.
CONCLUSION
Society, with this rapid technological development, finds
itself in an unexpected place. The Court sought to guard
against an erosion of privacy, among other values, caused by
the government. Today, however, a situation unanticipated by
the Court has developed where there is an erosion of privacy,
but a conditioned erosion driven by a combination of youthful
252 Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
253 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
254 Id. at 2629-30.
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viewpoint and exuberance and rapid technological advances.
This development challenges traditional notions of privacy ex-
pectations. Of the options discussed, Justice Harlan once again
poses the most viable solution. While the resolution of "what if
Savana Redding had a cell phone?" may not be any easier to
reach through his alternative balancing test, the strongest an-
swer is not always the easiest. Justice Harlan's test, while no
simpler, may be the truer. It asks the right questions: in its
most basic form, should youth be saddled with risking such an
invasion of their privacy simply because of their age and tech-
nological savvy? Harlan's formula allows courts to examine the
actual practice at issue with that question in the background.
It also allows room for the reality that the school setting may
indeed require "some easing of the restrictions" on searches for
the safety of the suspect and others. 255
Expectations of privacy are evolving and technology's ad-
vancement warns against tying social norms and subjective
expectations to current technological capabilities. Therefore,
the Court's assumption-of-risk approach may become a sterile
self-fulfilling exercise unless a more fundamental value-laden
analysis is made to determine whether the invasion at issue
should occur with or without protection from the Fourth
Amendment, and if so, then what degree of protection the
Amendment should afford.
255 NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
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